Thursday, 20 November 2025

Got Whacked by UOB Cashplus Account- Paid Net S$60 For Nothing So Goodbye!

I am saying goodbye to my UOB CashPlus account which I have been holding on for more than a decade. The main reason for opening this account with United Overseas Bank ("UOB") then was that this account came with a cheque book for use. However, I find that my usage of cheques have been declining. The Monetary Authority of Singapore will also be phasing out personal cheques after their initiative to terminate corporate cheques usage by December 2026. This product actually offers an extremely attractive low personal interest rate of 3.3% to 3.34% per annum for 6mths-12mths financing under the current promotion subject to a monthly minimum repayment of 2.5% of outstanding balances. In event of a default, an exorbitant 29.98% of interest rate per annum will apply if the minimum repayments are not made.
Shocked by Charge of S$120 Management Fees Without Full Waiver.
Every year, there is a S$120 management fees payable. Usually, I will dial into the hotline to seek a waiver and usually, I will get a full waiver of this fees. However, this year was bad, the bank only waived off 50% and hence a net S$60 was deducted from my CashPlus account.  

Anyway, water under the bridge. I decided to terminate this CashPlus account since I was not really using it anyway. Apparently, account closure for CashPlus cannot be done via internet banking or phone banking. There is a written notice option but I could not find the detailed information such as what to include in the letter/email. So I decided to use the most direct solution of going down to one of the UOB branches to do this. This proved to the fastest way for accounts closure as by the next day, I noticed that my CashPlus account is no longer showing up in my UOB internet banking- no more leakage of unnecessary expense for maintaining this account.

Tuesday, 18 November 2025

Is US Plunging Into A Recession Or Already In One?

Wow, so many videos and posts recently with regard to the private credit crisis in US. The First Brands and Tricolor bankruptcies have scared the "sheet" out of many people. The AI bubble also seems to be worsening with many investors and experts sounding alarm with regard to Open AI Sam Altman's management team proposing idea of a backstop guarantee by the US government to lower financing cost for its chips investment and data centres setup. High AI CAPEX spending but low profit generation maybe a recipe for imminent financial disaster? 

So do you folks think that a US triggered global recession is on the horizon and what are the adjustments you made to your investment portfolio? Let me know your thoughts and comments. 

Thursday, 6 November 2025

Disappointing Private Placement Exercise By Lendlease Global Commercial REIT To Acquire Paya Lebar Quarter Mall.

This is another classic anti-existing unit-holders move by another REIT Management on SGX and extremely disappointing. I can still vividly recalled the IPO price of S$0.88 per unit by Lendlease Global Commercial REIT ("LREIT") on September 25, 2019. Unfortunately, its current market price as at November 4, 2025 is just S$0.635 per unit which is a faint shard of its former self at IPO. To add salt to injury, the Management of LREIT did not seek to raise funds first with existing unit-holders via a right issue but instead elected for a private placement. Totally no respect and appreciation to loyal current unit-holders especially those that have subscribed since IPO inception. Consequently, this lead to many loyal unit-holders, who continued to invest in LREIT, to become severely diluted by this acquisition.

1. Disappointing Private Placement By Management of LREIT
The only good news here is that on November 6, 2025 morning, LREIT has announced the results of the private fund raising at an issuance price of S$0.602 per unit, which is just a 3.7% discount to the adjusted weighted average price. Considering that the initial target was between S$0.597 per unit to S$0.616 per unit, the price of S$0.602 through private placement is considered not too low. Nevertheless, this is still an extremely disappointing move by the management of LREIT that ignored loyal retail unit-holders. 


2. General Assessment of PLQ Mall Acquisition
This is a very good retail asset that is located just besides 2 MRT lines. You would need to go down to PLQ Mall to see and experience for yourself. It is currently on 100% full occupancy.  Increasing the share of suburban retail in the portfolio of LREIT should make its earnings more resilient. 

Additionally, this acquisition of 70% of PLQ Mall will be DPU yield accretive by 2.5% post-acquisition.

The bad point of this acquisition exercise  is that the Aggregate Leverage of LREIT will increase from 35.1% to 38.3%  

Parting Thoughts
LREIT is embarking on a Singapore-focused strategy for now with Singapore assets forming close to 90% of its portfolio. Suburban retail will now made up 63% of total portfolio relative to pre-acquisition of 55%. The only remaining problem is with its "Grade A Office" of Sky Complex at Milan which has not been performing well since the loss of a major office tenant. Also, the management of LREIT has not been exactly friendly to existing unit-holders and took the easy way out of opting for a private placement route to raise funds for M&A. Retail investors need to be wary of the current management of LREIT who are only after their self interest at the expense of unit-holders. I will be looking to pare down some of my stakes in LREIT.  

Saturday, 1 November 2025

Investment Portfolios Updates (31 Oct 2025) - Net Investment of S$910K and Projected Annualised Passive Income of S$48K.



A rising tide lifts all boats indeed. My net investment portfolio jumped by almost +S$100K within 2 months (from S$813K to S$910K) mainly due to the rise of Alibaba AI and Cloud play as well as the revival in Singapore REITs. Gross investment is now at another record high of S$1.179Mil.

1. Portfolio 1- Stocks Held in SGX Central Depository 
Not much changes here except for the higher market valuation. Unfortunately, there is very little changes in the amount of projected dividends.

2. Portfolio 2- Margin Purchased Securities
(Note: My margin purchased securities has grown to a sufficient scale to sustain itself and can pay off annual financing charges as well as to gradually pay down the margin loan through the dividends generated.) 

Keppel Ltd has been delivering a super impressive profit growth of 25% (if we normalise and exclude the one-off recorded loss for sales of M1) for the 9mth ending 2025. In addition, have subscribed for 5000 excess units of Keppel Date Centre REIT ("KDC") and managed to get all- please see here for the past blog post I made.

3. Portfolio 3 (with Tiger Brokers and MooMoo) 
(Venture into higher risk as well as capital growth stocks here)
Have foraged into an additional new stock BYD here that is manufacturer of EV cars and batteries. BYD is one of the few contenders out there (besides Toyota and CATL) that is on the verge of successful mass production of the next generation of EV solid state battery. Solid state batteries is the next stage evolution for EV or arguably the “holy grail” of EV which will enhance mileage by at least 50% and significantly improved recharging time-please refer to my previous post in 2018 regarding the first working prototype of solid state battery. Unfortunately, the mass production has been filled with enormous technical challenges hence mass market adoption projection is expected to be around 2027 or even 2030. 

4. Portfolio 4 (Endowus Unit Trusts & Other Investments)
I have added investment into 2 new unit trusts via Endowus, that is the (i) Allspring Global Equity Enhanced Income Fund and the (ii) Franklin Gold and Precious Metals Fund. 

Parting Thoughts
Currently, my growth strategy investment is on Alibaba and BYD in China market. I continue to stay away from the US market (except for a small stake in United Healthcare Group). Overall, I am still committed to my dividend passive income strategy and continue to build it up gradually by increasing stakes in Unit Trusts to ensure sufficient diversification. 

Ok. that's all for today Folks. Have a great week ahead!

Tuesday, 28 October 2025

Keppel Pacific Oak US REIT Reaffirms Resumption of Distribution By 2nd Half of 2026.

Ouch, this has been so painful for existing unitholders of Keppel Oak Pacific REIT ("KORE"). YoY distribution income for 9mth ending FY2025 dropped <14.8%>. Higher financing cost as well as spike in the Trust expenses rise +6% on a YoY basis. The good news here is that the occupancy rate remains stable at 88% while rental reversion is a huge positive +9.6%. So finally, there appears to be some lights at the end of the tunnel for KORE. 

1. The Very Good News
KORE's management has asserted that barring unforeseen circumstances, it is on track to restart income distribution for 1H FY2026 by 2H FY2026.

2. The Very Bad News
The news of the restart of distribution unfortunately comes with a caveat. KORE's management will only do a partial payout for the 1st initial distribution in FY2026 in order to be conservative and only progressively increase this payout ratio.

Moreover, one has to contend with significant opportunity cost of remaining vested in KORE while this sum of money can be redeployed immediately to alternate investments.  
Parting Thoughts- Decide for Yourself
Overall, KORE remains in a better financial position relative to its peers, Manulife US REIT and Prime US REIT. Last but not least, there is an opportunity cost to everything. One has to weight the pros and cons of holding onto KORE. 

Keppel DC REIT Rights Results And Thoughts On Future Prospects Of This "Growth" REIT.

This is to give an update to my last post "Taking a Punt in Keppel DC REIT Rights Issue To Make Small Immediate Profit". Interestingly, market price of Keppel DC REIT ("KDC") did not drop below S$2.40 per unit after the rights issuance and in fact went up to S$2.43 per unit as at Oct 28, 2025. Anyway, I managed to get all my excess rights issue of 5,000 units of KDC units. So in a way, I have realised immediate profit of +S$750 from selling off 5,000 units my KDC holdings on Oct 6, 2025 and also managed to get back all the 5,000 units that I had earlier sold off via the excess rights subscription.

Future Prospects of KDC
The current distribution yield for KDC is at a miserable 4.2%. The stock market seems to be awarding a market premium per unit over the net assets per unit of KDC. This can be attributed to the M&A path that the management of KDC is embarking on which will mean growth in its DPU. With a market premium over its net asset, it will be easy for KDC to find yield accretive data centres to add on. This is the virtue cycle of a REIT that is highly sought after.

Parting Thoughts
I do not particularly rejoice in owning too many KDC units as I do not like the constant request for capital injection via rights issue. Personally, I thought that buying into its sponsor, Keppel Ltd, maybe a better alternative rather than investing into KDC at the current market price of S$2.43 per unit. 

Thursday, 16 October 2025

Aztech Global Disastrous Financial Performance and Share Price Since IPO.

Aztech Global listed in March 2021 at S$1.28 per share. Its current share price has plunged by a jaw dropping -47% to S$0.675 per share since IPO. I can't help but feel a sense of Deja Vu as Aztech reminded me of the many short drama plots about "Reborn" and reliving a previous life. Back in March 8, 2021, I have posted a blog on 5 reasons on why I will be giving this IPO a miss. Given that Aztech just recently announced a -21.2% drop in net profit to S$10.8Mil for 3rd quarter ending September 30, 2025 as well as declining revenue for 3rd quarter with a horrendous -19.9% plunge to S$133.5Mil from S$166.7Mil, the probability of it following the old playbook of privatising at a huge discount seems to be imminent (personal thoughts only).  

Aztech is another classic example of why retail investors should not be too fixated on high dividend (7%-8%) yield without considering other business factors such as type of business and associated risks as well as track record of management team.