Sunday, 10 November 2019

Singapore Press Holdings and SPH REIT Review- Media Segment Continues to Worsen But Bright Spot From Property Segment

Singapore Press Holdings ("SPH") continues to face headwind in its Media Segment. The media  business faces decline in print advertisement and circulation revenue. Worse still, the bloodletting from technological disruption has not reached the trough and its operating results is expected to deteriorate. Media revenue dropped from S$ 656Mil in FY2018 to S$ 577Mil in FY2019 which is a 12% decline. Media profit plunged from S$98.7Mil in FY2018 to S$54.7Mil which is a shocking 44.6% decline. At one point in time, its share price dipped below S$2 per share. Another round of retrenchment exercise has been announced by SPH to shave off 5% of staff in its Media Group. It has since recovered to S$2.34 as at 8 November 2019.
Extract of Business Segment Performance-Profits before taxation
Despite the pessimistic outlook for its Media Segment, there is a bright spot in SPH, that is, their Property business segment which continued to grow from strength to strength,. As overall outlook of SPH is not stable and no one knows exactly when the bottoming out of the Media business will occur, my preference is to invest only in SPH REIT until there is more clarity to SPH future projections. 

A delightful piece of good news was announced by SPH this week. 

SPH REIT Revealed Another Major Surprise- Acquisition of New Australian Super Regional Shopping Mall in Adelaide
SPH REIT announced on 7 November 2019 that it has acquired a joint venture stake from Lendlease Real Estate Investments Limited Group in Westfield Marion Shopping Centre, Adelaide, South Australia for S$637Mil. This was a major surprise to many investors and myself who thought that the recent fund raising via S$300Mil of perpetual securities was to fund the purchase of Seletar Mall from SPH. While I have previously posted  that the last December 2018 acquisition of Figtree Grove Shopping Mall would give SPH REIT management team invaluable management exposure and networking into the Australian market, I never expect that the next Australian retail acquisition to come so quickly in less than a year. 
Extract of Westfield Marion Shopping Centre Details
SPH REIT still no fate to be with Seletar Mall
I can't help but feel a tinge of sadness as Seletar Mall once again escaped from the clutch of SPH REIT, notwithstanding the surprise acquisition of a good quality Australian freehold asset. But the good news is that Seletar Mall is still in the future pipeline of SPH REIT. So too is the Woodleigh shopping mall which is under construction which bodes well for the future growth of SPH REIT.
The Seletar Mall
Parting Thoughts
SPH has been building up its Property division for a number of years to diversify away from its traditional media business and this strategy is bearing fruits. Besides the property development and retail REIT portions, another superb sub-segment is its student accommodation business which is widely viewed as extremely defensive with strong resilient earnings even in economic downturn. Unfortunately, to get a piece of student accommodation action, one would need to invest in SPH as this is not available on SPH REIT. Perhaps SPH may start another REIT in future that focuses on student accommodation. 

First REIT Q3 FY2019 Performance Review- Does The Decline In Property Income Signal Trend Of Worsening Performance Of Siloam Hospitals?

It is interesting to see the financial announcement from First REIT shouting out "First REIT achieves stable DPU of 2.15 cents for Q3 2019". As with all marketing techniques, highlight the good extensively but downplay the bad news.  Despite maintaining the quarter DPU to 2.15 cents, rental and other income for the quarter dipped 1.5% YoY to S$28.8Mil as a result of lower variable rental component for the Indonesian hospitals. In addition, net property income dipped 2.5% YoY to S$28.3Mil due to higher property expenses for its South Korea and Indonesia properties.
Does the decline in property income signal trend of worsening performance of Indonesian Hospitals?
Results released does not seemed to be too well in terms of organic growth and maybe the start of a worsening trend. This will greatly affect what the expiring lease for 5 hospitals and hotel/Country Club can offer for upcoming rental renewal exercise. While CEO Victor Tan has mentioned that First REIT has a low gearing ratio of 34.5% as at 30 September 2019 and are reviewing options to make further yield-accretive acquistions to boost their portfolio, I have serious doubt on how they plan to achieve that given the current high dividend yield at the weakened share price. Also, the signal given off by the sponsor and manager of First REIT seems to be hinting at letting First REIT take on forex exposure in future by denoting the rental income of Master Lease Agreements in Indonesian Rupiah instead of Singdollars.

Lease renewal of 5 properties due at end of 2021- Bad vibes on the eventual release of results of negotiation in 2020.
The risk of First REIT renewing the upcoming expiring lease of the first batch of proprieties at 80% plunge in rental rates in the worse case scenario cannot be ignored. Till  now, I cannot comprehend why the Sponsor Lippo Karawaci would have agreed to lease from First REIT and then charge a heavily discounted 80% rental rate to its subsidiary Siloam Hospitals and Healthcare Group for the initial properties injected into First REIT. It just does not make commercial sense to me and is clearly unsustainable. I have a very bad vibe on how the negotiation will unfold. It is certainly not inconceivable that the results will definitely be an unfavorable decrease in rental rates. The only question is how massive is the discount which First REIT has to give to Siloam in order to renew the Master Lease Agreement.

Please see my previous post on this topic here: "First REIT Review PART 2- Super High Yield of Over 8% And Possibility of 80% Drop in Rental Income For Upcoming Renewal Of Expiring Hospitals".

Summary
Organic growth seems to be tapering off for First REIT. The unknown results of the negotiation of the expiring 5 properties have pushed up the risk premium and yield required by investors to 8.3% based on an annualised DPU of 8.6 cents per unit and pricing of S$1.03 per unit as at 8 November 2019 (Friday). I think that it will be hard to proceed with other potential M&A opportunities without a quick settlement of the expiring lease agreements issues.  The next quarter results are important to see whether the negative growth continues from Siloam hospitals. 

Monday, 4 November 2019

Eagle Hospitality Trust Imploded From Within On Valuation Concerns Of Other Hotel Assets In Portfolio-Down 40% To All Time Low From IPO Debut In May’19


During my last post, I have pointed out that besides the “Curse of the Queen Mary”, there are at least a few scenarios that can happen to cause further downsides. Unfortunately, a new issue did indeed surfaced besides the "Queen Mary potential lease default rumor”. Based on the recent announcement by Eagle Hospitality Trust (“EHT”), SGX had raised several queries with regard to the other hotels in the stable of portfolio of EHT. Investors panic and it seems that they do not buy the reply by EHT management and became even more skeptical on the valuation of the other hotels held in the Trust.

The first day debut of the IPO already took into account the forex risk and other business risk. The “Curse of Queen Mary” issue shaved off around another 20% off that recently. However, prices still continue to dip which means that the recent announcement concerning the major shareholders disposing hotels to EHT prior to the IPO is making existing shareholders very uncomfortable with the valuation of the other hotel assets.

From the range of S$0.545 to S$0.585 per unit since the lifting of the trading halt, it plummeted to an all day low of S$0.470 per unit on 4th November 2019 (Monday). This is another 20% plunge in value which indicated that investors were extremely worried that there is something wrong with the entire Trust and whether most of the hotel assets can indeed generate the required lease income to sustain the projected distribution.

SGX Query on 1 November 2019 and reply from EHT:
Extract of the latest round of query from SGX on the 6 hotels from ASAP Holdings sold to the Sponsor
What are the other concern here besides the notorious “Curse of the Queen Mary” that causes the price to plunge further to S$0.470 per unit (40% price collapse)?
SGX Query on 1 November 2019 and reply from EHT:
To summarise the above reply to SGX, this would mean that ASAP Holdings sold the 6 hotels to Urban Commons (Sponsor). EHT in turn buys from Urban Commons the 6 hotels at a higher price than what the sponsor had paid originally to ASAP Holdings due to the differences as mentioned in the SGX reply by EHT. As to exactly how much more EHT had paid relative to the prior 3 months acquisition price between Urban Commons and ASAP Holdings, it was not disclosed. So it may appear that EHT is getting the shorter end of the stick by a mere 3 months differences. Many existing investors may now have concern over the suddenly inflated valuation in just 3 short months of clever financial engineering. There will also be lingering doubts on the income generating abilities of not just the said 6 hotel assets but also the entire other hotel assets placed in the Trust. Why not just sell the 6 hotels directly to EHT instead of to Sponsor and then Sponsor sell to EHT?

Also most importantly, some investors may probably begin to wonder whether there are some hidden agenda or internal rebate programme between Urban Commons (Sponsor) and ASAP Holdings. This gives rise to the next set of questions from SGX as discussed in the next section below. Are they related parties? 

Who are the actual owners of ASAP Holdings which sold 6 hotels to Urban Commons which in turn injected these assets into EHT for IPO? Are they related to Urban Commons (Sponsor)?
ASAP Holdings are held by Frank Yuan, Norbert Yuan and Jerome Yuan. ASAP Holdings is a California-based acquisition advisory and asset management firm specializing in hotel assets which has had known business dealings with the Sponsor in the past. However, they are unrelated to the Sponsor or key management of EHT and are 3rd parties.

How did they end up also as shareholders in EHT IPO? Also what are relationships between the Yuans?
Frank Yuan, Norbert Yuan and Jerome Yuan were introduced by the Sponsor to the EHT IPO placement agents. They took up private placement tranche making up 33.4% of the total number of stapled securities on the listing date.
SGX Query on 1 November 2019 and reply from EHT:

Are these substantial shareholders still holding on to their shares/units in EHT?
Yes. BUT unfortunately, the Yuans have begun paring down their interest in EHT and selling their units in millions for the past few weeks. This maybe perceived as a signal or proxy with regard to their views and outlook on EHT future. 

Norbert Yuan started with 120Mil of stapled securities. As at 30 Oct 2019, his stakes via Compass Cove Assets Limited had dropped to 94.2Mil units only. Read the other numerous announcements on "Change of interest of substantial shareholders" to find out how many shares were being dumped by the other members of the Yuan family.


Parting Thoughts
The substantial shareholders (Yuan family) who held 33% stakes in EHT during listing are hotel business specialists. The fact that they began dumping millions of shares in the market not only created tremendous selling pressure but also signal a possible negative outlook on EHT businesses. Coupled with the fact that many investors are extremely concerned with the valuation of the hotel assets acquired from ASAP Holdings and then injected into EHT by Urban Commons, the red flag on whether the entire hotel assets can indeed generate the necessary rental income as originally projected were now being raised. 

Going concern of the entire Trust maybe another major issue that investors are worried due to not just the Queen Mary default rumour but also the manner of the financial engineering of the 6 hotels acquired from ASAP Holdings which were eventually injected into EHT by the Sponsor. Skeptical investors may perceive such a move to insinuate ulterior motive by the Sponsor to make easy money by dumping poor quality assets into EHT.

I hope that the release of the 3rd quarter results by next week (13th Nov 2019) will reassure all investors. The current challenge seems to be mainly the lack of confidence in the Sponsor which resulted in a dividend yield of 13.5% based on current unit price of S$0.475. But then again, what if the sixth sense of many investors are correct and it turns out that the Trust have lots of fundamental issues as evident from the various strange things that keep popping up at EHT?

Monday, 28 October 2019

Sengkang Grand Residences Mixed Integrated Development at Buangkok MRT

Sengkang Grand Residences is one of the most anticipated new launch of the year. This development  is directly linked up with Buangkok MRT station and it has a hawker centre and retail mall inbuilt into it. Residents living in Sengkang Grand will enjoy convenient access to all these amenities right under their home. 

As this is a CDL and Capitaland joint development, one can be assured of the quality of luxury finishing of their purchased home. 

Prices are expected to start from S$1,600psf plus and estimated pricing as follow:
(i) 1 bedder + study: S$798K;
(ii) 2 bedder: S$998K;
(iii) 3 bedder: s$1,498K and
(iv) 4 bedder + flexi: S$2.1Mil

There are a few points here that prospective buyers need to be aware of:

1. Car parking might be an issue- Only 80% of parking lots provided for residents
Total residential units in this development is 680. However, parking lots available are only 544 on level 3, Mezzanine A and B. In other words, only 80% parking lots are provided. The property agents will tell you that many units to be purchased are for investors who will rent out to tenants. Hence these tenants of smaller units will not be driving and only taking MRT. 

I just think that this is very strange for a luxury development as if one can afford paying almost S$1Mil plus for a 2 bedder and above, the residents here will most likely also own a car. As a matter of fact, some may even own multiple cars.  Also, how about visitors of residents to the development?

This may lead to future animosity among residents in the 2nd year AGM after the MCST is formed. Have seen a few cases of such disagreements being surfaced even for 1 to 1 parking with regard to how parking lots are allocated.

Do bear in mind that property agents will not be living in this development after your TOP. So best to get some clarity on how the developer and their first year management plan to resolve this issue.

2. Lack of privacy- Some blocks have up to 10 units per floor.
As the number of floors is only around  8 to 10 levels, the developers have squeezed many units into the 9 blocks in order to get to the 682 units.  Some blocks will have up to 10 units on the same floor while most of the others will have 8 units. The ideal case for private exclusivity is 4 per floor. 

Potential buyers will have to assess whether they are fine living with so many neighbours living together on the same floor. It maybe best to avoid the block with 10 units per floor during selection. 

Potential buyers of Sengkang Grand residences will also need to see whether they are comfortable with the number of lifts serving all units in one block. This is especially so during the morning rush hours when parents are sending kids to school or going to work.

3. Unit Layout- 2 bedders and 4 bedders here are better than 3 bedders in terms of functional usage.
This point can be personal and depends on whether you are a balcony lover. For me, I do not like balcony in the Master bedroom as it is a waste of space. I would rather have this balcony space moved to the living room area to be combined into 1 bigger balcony space than having a space that is neither big nor small for usage. To me, balcony in a master bedroom is just a white space.



Hence I think that the 3 bedders layout is a no no to me. 

4. Facing of some blocks is East and West
In Singapore, I would suggest folks go by the general convention to go for North-South facing units and skip the blocks that have either morning or afternoon sun. If no choice and have to choose a East-West facing block, then go for the stack that only have morning sun (East facing) so that when you come back from work in the evening, your home does not feel too hot and warm which may agitate one especially after a hard and stressful day at work already.

Summary
Overall, Sengkang Grand Residences is a very good development. Since CDL and Capitaland have bid over S$1 billion for the site, their breakeven price is around S$1,500psf. Hence, selling at S$1,600psf plus as a starting base is considered a good price for a new integrated development. For me, at this price, my personal preference would be to buy a cheaper resales unit at Punggol Watertown which has the mega mall Punggol Waterway Point right at the doorstep and also comes with Shaw Cinema.

Saturday, 26 October 2019

Price Meltdown For Eagle Hospitality Trust- The Curse Of Queen Mary

Eagle Hospitality Trust ("EHT") IPO debuted at a price of US$0.78 per unit back in May 2019 with lackluster response from retail investors which resulted in one of the worst ever under subscription record for the year. It eventually closed off at a disastrous pricing of US$0.73 per unit for the day which was a 6.9% decline. The nightmare does not end for shareholders of EHT as it continues to plunge in value into the USD$0.64 to USD$0.70 range over the next few months. Unfortunately, the bloodbath rages on with a price meltdown when the issue of lease default on one of its major property asset held in the form of the iconic Queen Mary cruise ship surfaced. This is shocking as the sponsor (Urban Commons) has just listed the trust on SGX. Queen Mary at Long Beach California was valued at US$159.4Mil and makes up 12.55% of the total valuation of the 18 hotel properties (US$1.27 Billion) which are being launched into the Trust. 
Valuation of the 18 hotel properties in Eagle Hospitality Trust
The Curse of Queen Mary
The Queen Mary is a hot tourism spot at Long Beach California which draws more than 1.5 million tourists annually to the site. The City of Long Beach had served a letter on the sponsor Urban Commons for potential default of lease due to essential repair works concerning structural integrity which were not carried out and may lead to the collapse of the ship and cause safety issues for its staff and tourists visiting or staying on board. Urban Commons is required to provide a response to the demand letter by the City of Long Beach. There is thus a perceived risk that Urban Commons may be found to be in default of the lease. If so, EHT will lose all rental income from the Master Lessee. 

An interesting point to note is that Queen Mary was voted one of the Top 10 most haunted places in America by Time magazine given its long and colorful history. The current meltdown in EHT market price makes me wonder whether the ghosts of Queen Mary are haunting it and causing the spate of bad luck?


Is Eagle Hospitality Trust currently oversold?
It is strange that after the suspension of trading halt was lifted and despite extensive clarification by EHT that its sponsor did not default on the lease, many investors simply panic (or maybe a lot of them lost hope) and keep unloading their stocks. As at 25 October 2019 (Friday), the price of EHT was at an astounding all time low of S$0.545 per unit which is a 31% plunge in price from IPO. This is an impressive dividend yield of 11.5% if there is no default and business goes on as usual for Queen Mary. 

In the event of default, distribution is expected to be reduced by around 20%. 

In terms of valuation of EHT, it will drop by 12.55% as per the aforesaid adopted valuation of key assets.

Compare the expected decline in yield or valuation relative to the current 31% decrease in price, there seems to be a  more than 10% margin of safety for current investors who took up position.

Risk of further selldown of EHT- Red flag indicators
The point here to note is that the above math is based on stripping out the financial contribution of Queen Mary to EHT. I can actually think of at least 3 scenarios that can worsen the entire situation and self implode EHT notwithstanding the Queen Mary problem. The key point to note here is that Urban Commons had claimed that all along, structural issues had been resolved. But it remains a fact that if so, why would the authorities of City of Long Beach issue out such a letter to Urban Commons and demanded a reply by 31 Oct 2019?

Other red flag questions investors need to ask here are:

(i) Is Urban Commons facing cashflow issue here such that only selective bare minimum key repair works can be performed?

(ii) The issue of default conditions are at dispute here. Urban Commons definition and the City of Long Beach definition are different. Why would the City of Long Beach send out the letter if Urban Commons had been diligently carrying all out repairs deemed necessary?

(iii) What are the values of the senior management and working culture at Urban Commons, the sponsor of EHT? The current incident whereby they served the letter by the City of Long Beach actually does say something about them. At the bare minimum, the communication standard is poor that lead to the breakdown in understanding on both sides.

(iv) Will there be a potential law suit in future by the City of Long Beach against Urban Commons?

(v) Is Queen Mary the only property affected? If the sponsor turns out to be under financial distress due to any of the above, EHT will be negatively affected not just by Queen Mary but in fact all the rental income from its lessee are at risk (please see below screenshot on Master Lease Agreements). Hence it is a fallacy to simply assume that segregating out the Queen Mary will derive the net value of the remaining hotels. All the Master Lessees are actually literally on the same boat.


Parting Thoughts
No one has a crystal ball to know exactly whether the current situation will deteriorate further or it is just simply an over-reaction by the market. Investment is based on one's assessment of the probability of good news or bad news to determine valuation. Risks are inherent in all businesses.

For myself, I have started picking up some stakes in EHT as I find the entry price very attractive to compensate for the potential downside risks. I would never imagine myself to be holding on to hospitality related businesses as I find them too cyclical in nature and bad for my heart. It is a taboo for me. For EHT, the current price meltdown as well as the attractive fixed rental income component of 66% relative to 34% variable component made me change my mind.

Friday, 18 October 2019

First REIT Review PART 2- Super High Yield of Over 8% And Possibility of 80% Drop in Rental Income For Upcoming Renewal Of Expiring Hospitals


During my last posting on First REIT, I have mentioned the shocking analysis by Phillip Securities Research team that there is a potential 80% rental income gap once Lippo Karawaci exit itself from the upcoming lease renewal exercise of the first batch of expiring hospitals and leave negotiation to between First REIT and Siloam group. I have written an email to the Investor Relation team of First REIT to seek further clarifications on the assertions that were being made by the analyst. 

This morning, I received a return call from First REIT Investor Relation officer. I must say that they are very professional and prompt in their response. This actually speaks volume of the type of good management philosophy and values of the First REIT team lead by their CEO, Victor Tan.

The below are the key highlights of my discussion with the Investor Relation Officer of First REIT this morning:

·        Yes, it is true. There is an 80% rental income support by the sponsor Lippo Karawaci to Siloam. This is not a typo in Phillip Securities Research report. This issue was first raised up about a year ago by OCBC’s Research team.

·        Background was that Siloam used to be a business division under Lippo Karawaci. Hence master lease was signed between First REIT and Lippo Karawaci. After listing of Siloam Hospital Group in 2013 as a separate legal entity, new leases began to be negotiated directly between Lippo Karawaci and First REIT.

·        There are many investors who have been also asking this question at various investors road show.

·        There are a number of stakeholders involved in the negotiation, namely, Lippo OUE, Lippo Karawaci and Siloam Group. Many teams of lawyers representing the different stakeholders are trying to reach a draft agreement. The targeted date to present out a first cut for EGM to shareholders will be around December 2020 which is one year before the expiry of the master lease for the first batch of properties. However, First REIT is aware of the concern by many shareholders and is trying to present a proposal for shareholders’ approval way before the 1 year expiry target date. In the event that the proposed new lease agreement is rejected by shareholders (Lippo will abstain their votes for this EGM), they will go back to the drawing board. 

·         80% drop in rental in the worst case scenario is unlikely. According to the Investor Relation Officer, if the rental is so low, they might as well decide to let another healthcare group to come in to operate the hospital.
  
My Personal thoughts:
I can only conclude that there are various ticking time bombs inside First REIT that I was unaware of until the recent turn of events. The first one that is set to go off will be the first batch of expiring hospitals and hotel under Lippo Karawaci in December 2021.

I think that the probability the renewal will be done at a lower rate is almost 100% given that the financial statements of Siloam is clearly showing that its financial resources will not be able to cover the entire huge gap of 80% subsidy by Lippo Karawaci based on the detective work done by the analysts combing through the 2018 annual report of Siloam.

The only question is how much will be the drop in rental income? The first batch expiring is due only in December 2021 and make up only 22% revenue of total revenue. Hence assuming a 50% confirmed drop in rental income from Siloam during the lease renewal exercise, it will translate to only a 11% decline in overall property income of First REIT. Remaining lease only expire in year 2025 to 2032 which is still a long way to go.

Has this been priced into the current market price per unit of First REIT?
Before the issue of the credit crunch and lease renewal came up, First REIT units were trading at a range of of $1.30 to S$1.40 range in 2018. Its price dropped to almost S$0.90 during the credit default risk period but eventually recover to hold at around S$1.00 to S$1.10 after the rights issue by its sponsor, Lippo Karawaci. This is approximately a 25% to 30% correction in price by the market due to the uncertainty over the upcoming lease renewal exercise. It would appear that the market had already priced in most of the reduction from the original 6.5% yield as risk premiums. The yield has now shot up to 8.4% based on current market unit price of S$1.01 per unit.

The risk is price may drop by another 11% in line with the net decreased impact of the first batch of renewed properties by 50% or worse, investors may extrapolate and automatically price in expected future declines in all properties to derive a more sustainable property income and associated dividends. It will be hard to visualize the equilibrium point to be reached if investors views are so pessimistic.  

What if renewed lease is no longer in SGD but IDR denominated?
Also, on the issue of new lease contract being in IDR instead of SGD which gives rise to forex fluctuations, the CEO Victor Tan had mentioned previously that he can peg the rental adjustment to  higher inflation rates benchmark in Indonesia rather than Singapore in order to close up the exposure in forex risk.

Parting thoughts
First REIT remained a higher risk REIT relative to other REITS due to the many variables surrounding it. For me, I will gradually be doing a partial paring down of my stakes in First REIT over the next 1 year to reduce concentration risk in view of the latest information but I maintain an optimistic view that much of the negative information has already been priced into this REIT with a long WALE of 8 years in the medium term. Also, 8.4% yield up to Dec 2021 before the first batch of hospital properties reached expiry represented an almost 17% (2 years’ worth of dividends compensation) to cover any further downside. Part of my optimism comes in from the new CEO John Riady who confirmed that Healthcare will be one of Lippo’s key business unit (which is at lower risk of technological disruption). It also does not make sense for both Lippo Karawaci and Lippo OUE to dramatically destroy their own reputation by dropping the rental to the extreme scenario of 80% as they still need to tap capital from the market.

Wednesday, 16 October 2019

First REIT Review- Super High Yield of Over 8% And Possibility of 80% Drop in Rental Income For Upcoming Renewal Of Expiring Hospitals


I just saw something shocking from an analyst report by Phillip Securities Research on 7th October 2019 with regard to First REIT. Basically, the uncertainties over the lease renewal of expiring hospitals and a hotel in 2021 seems to be the main cause of the low unit price despite the completion of the fund raising via rights issue exercise by Lippo Karawaci to resolve the previous rental default risk. Apparently, there is another significant risk of as much as 80% income support deficit should the sponsor decides to leave direct negotiation between Siloam and First REIT. This information is something very material because if it is true, it means that in the worst case scenario, First REIT maybe worth only 20 cents (by applying similar 80% discount to recent market price of S$1.01) per unit since such principle will apply to all hospitals tenancy agreements eventually.

The earliest lease expiry of 5 properties will start between August 2021 and December 2021. FIRST REIT will probably give some indication on negotiation status and key renewal contractual clauses 1 year before the expiry, that is at around August 2020 next year. Please see below screenshot.

Background giving rise to the shocking analysis by the Analyst
According to the Analyst, Siloam hospital operations are on stable footing and Lippo Karawaci could potentially step out of the lease renewal negotiation and let Siloam and First REIT deal directly with one another. Lippo Karawaci’s hospital operator division is known as PT Siloam International Hospitals (“Siloam”) and is listed in September 2013 on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Lippo Karawaci owns 51% of Siloam and provides income support by subsidizing 80% of the rental for the hospitals.

Siloam is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. In FY2018, rental paid to Lippo Karawaci was IDR125.5bn (S$12.2Mil), which only constitutes 20% of the rent paid to First REIT.
Now, not sure why is there such a thing as Lippo Karawaci subsidizing 80% rental indefinitely for its hospital business division as this does not make commercial sense. There must be a form of income recovery somewhere from Siloam. Else it means that Lippo Karawaci is running a substantial loss making business division perpetually. 80% free subsidy for another legal entity is incredulous even if it is a related party business. This also means that Lippo Karawaci had sponsored a healthcare REIT that has a ticking time bomb inbuilt during its IPO many years back.

I have written in to First REIT investor inquiry email for further clarifications to make light out of the whole enigmatic circumstances relating to the "income support" by sponsor.

Updates as at 18 Oct 2019- Reply from First REIT Investor Relation on the 80% sponsor income support.