Sengkang Grand Residences Mixed Integrated Development at Buangkok MRT

Sengkang Grand Residences is one of the most anticipated new launch of the year. This development  is directly linked up with Buangkok MRT station and it has a hawker centre and retail mall inbuilt into it. Residents living in Sengkang Grand will enjoy convenient access to all these amenities right under their home. 

As this is a CDL and Capitaland joint development, one can be assured of the quality of luxury finishing of their purchased home. 

Prices are expected to start from S$1,600psf plus and estimated pricing as follow:
(i) 1 bedder + study: S$798K;
(ii) 2 bedder: S$998K;
(iii) 3 bedder: s$1,498K and
(iv) 4 bedder + flexi: S$2.1Mil

There are a few points here that prospective buyers need to be aware of:

1. Car parking might be an issue- Only 80% of parking lots provided for residents

Total residential units in this development is 680. However, parking lots available are only 544 on level 3, Mezzanine A and B. In other words, only 80% parking lots are provided. The property agents will tell you that many units to be purchased are for investors who will rent out to tenants. Hence these tenants of smaller units will not be driving and only taking MRT. 

I just think that this is very strange for a luxury development as if one can afford paying almost S$1Mil plus for a 2 bedder and above, the residents here will most likely also own a car. As a matter of fact, some may even own multiple cars.  Also, how about visitors of residents to the development?

This may lead to future animosity among residents in the 2nd year AGM after the MCST is formed. Have seen a few cases of such disagreements being surfaced even for 1 to 1 parking with regard to how parking lots are allocated.

Do bear in mind that property agents will not be living in this development after your TOP. So best to get some clarity on how the developer and their first year management plan to resolve this issue.

2. Lack of privacy- Some blocks have up to 10 units per floor.

As the number of floors is only around  8 to 10 levels, the developers have squeezed many units into the 9 blocks in order to get to the 682 units.  Some blocks will have up to 10 units on the same floor while most of the others will have 8 units. The ideal case for private exclusivity is 4 per floor. 

Potential buyers will have to assess whether they are fine living with so many neighbours living together on the same floor. It maybe best to avoid the block with 10 units per floor during selection. 

Potential buyers of Sengkang Grand residences will also need to see whether they are comfortable with the number of lifts serving all units in one block. This is especially so during the morning rush hours when parents are sending kids to school or going to work.

3. Unit Layout- 2 bedders and 4 bedders here are better than 3 bedders in terms of functional usage.

This point can be personal and depends on whether you are a balcony lover. For me, I do not like balcony in the Master bedroom as it is a waste of space. I would rather have this balcony space moved to the living room area to be combined into 1 bigger balcony space than having a space that is neither big nor small for usage. To me, balcony in a master bedroom is just a white space.

Hence I think that the 3 bedders layout is a no no to me. 

4. Facing of some blocks is East and West

In Singapore, I would suggest folks go by the general convention to go for North-South facing units and skip the blocks that have either morning or afternoon sun. If no choice and have to choose a East-West facing block, then go for the stack that only have morning sun (East facing) so that when you come back from work in the evening, your home does not feel too hot and warm which may agitate one especially after a hard and stressful day at work already.

Summary

Overall, Sengkang Grand Residences is a very good development. Since CDL and Capitaland have bid over S$1 billion for the site, their breakeven price is around S$1,500psf. Hence, selling at S$1,600psf plus as a starting base is considered a good price for a new integrated development. For me, at this price, my personal preference would be to buy a cheaper resales unit at Punggol Watertown which has the mega mall Punggol Waterway Point right at the doorstep and also comes with Shaw Cinema.

Price Meltdown For Eagle Hospitality Trust- The Curse Of Queen Mary

Eagle Hospitality Trust ("EHT") IPO debuted at a price of US$0.78 per unit back in May 2019 with lackluster response from retail investors which resulted in one of the worst ever under subscription record for the year. It eventually closed off at a disastrous pricing of US$0.73 per unit for the day which was a 6.9% decline. The nightmare does not end for shareholders of EHT as it continues to plunge in value into the USD$0.64 to USD$0.70 range over the next few months. Unfortunately, the bloodbath rages on with a price meltdown when the issue of lease default on one of its major property asset held in the form of the iconic Queen Mary cruise ship surfaced. This is shocking as the sponsor (Urban Commons) has just listed the trust on SGX. Queen Mary at Long Beach California was valued at US$159.4Mil and makes up 12.55% of the total valuation of the 18 hotel properties (US$1.27 Billion) which are being launched into the Trust. 

Valuation of the 18 hotel properties in Eagle Hospitality Trust

The Curse of Queen Mary

The Queen Mary is a hot tourism spot at Long Beach California which draws more than 1.5 million tourists annually to the site. The City of Long Beach had served a letter on the sponsor Urban Commons for potential default of lease due to essential repair works concerning structural integrity which were not carried out and may lead to the collapse of the ship and cause safety issues for its staff and tourists visiting or staying on board. Urban Commons is required to provide a response to the demand letter by the City of Long Beach. There is thus a perceived risk that Urban Commons may be found to be in default of the lease. If so, EHT will lose all rental income from the Master Lessee. 

An interesting point to note is that Queen Mary was voted one of the Top 10 most haunted places in America by Time magazine given its long and colorful history. The current meltdown in EHT market price makes me wonder whether the ghosts of Queen Mary are haunting it and causing the spate of bad luck?

Is Eagle Hospitality Trust currently oversold?

It is strange that after the suspension of trading halt was lifted and despite extensive clarification by EHT that its sponsor did not default on the lease, many investors simply panic (or maybe a lot of them lost hope) and keep unloading their stocks. As at 25 October 2019 (Friday), the price of EHT was at an astounding all time low of S$0.545 per unit which is a 31% plunge in price from IPO. This is an impressive dividend yield of 11.5% if there is no default and business goes on as usual for Queen Mary. 

In the event of default, distribution is expected to be reduced by around 20%. 

In terms of valuation of EHT, it will drop by 12.55% as per the aforesaid adopted valuation of key assets.

Compare the expected decline in yield or valuation relative to the current 31% decrease in price, there seems to be a  more than 10% margin of safety for current investors who took up position.

Risk of further selldown of EHT- Red flag indicators

The point here to note is that the above math is based on stripping out the financial contribution of Queen Mary to EHT. I can actually think of at least 3 scenarios that can worsen the entire situation and self implode EHT notwithstanding the Queen Mary problem. The key point to note here is that Urban Commons had claimed that all along, structural issues had been resolved. But it remains a fact that if so, why would the authorities of City of Long Beach issue out such a letter to Urban Commons and demanded a reply by 31 Oct 2019?

Other red flag questions investors need to ask here are:

(i) Is Urban Commons facing cashflow issue here such that only selective bare minimum key repair works can be performed?

(ii) The issue of default conditions are at dispute here. Urban Commons definition and the City of Long Beach definition are different. Why would the City of Long Beach send out the letter if Urban Commons had been diligently carrying all out repairs deemed necessary?

(iii) What are the values of the senior management and working culture at Urban Commons, the sponsor of EHT? The current incident whereby they served the letter by the City of Long Beach actually does say something about them. At the bare minimum, the communication standard is poor that lead to the breakdown in understanding on both sides.

(iv) Will there be a potential law suit in future by the City of Long Beach against Urban Commons?

(v) Is Queen Mary the only property affected? If the sponsor turns out to be under financial distress due to any of the above, EHT will be negatively affected not just by Queen Mary but in fact all the rental income from its lessee are at risk (please see below screenshot on Master Lease Agreements). Hence it is a fallacy to simply assume that segregating out the Queen Mary will derive the net value of the remaining hotels. All the Master Lessees are actually literally on the same boat.

Parting Thoughts

No one has a crystal ball to know exactly whether the current situation will deteriorate further or it is just simply an over-reaction by the market. Investment is based on one's assessment of the probability of good news or bad news to determine valuation. Risks are inherent in all businesses.

For myself, I have started picking up some stakes in EHT as I find the entry price very attractive to compensate for the potential downside risks. I would never imagine myself to be holding on to hospitality related businesses as I find them too cyclical in nature and bad for my heart. It is a taboo for me. For EHT, the current price meltdown as well as the attractive fixed rental income component of 66% relative to 34% variable component made me change my mind.

First REIT Review PART 2- Super High Yield of Over 8% And Possibility of 80% Drop in Rental Income For Upcoming Renewal Of Expiring Hospitals

During my last posting on First REIT, I have mentioned the shocking analysis by Phillip Securities Research team that there is a potential 80% rental income gap once Lippo Karawaci exit itself from the upcoming lease renewal exercise of the first batch of expiring hospitals and leave negotiation to between First REIT and Siloam group. I have written an email to the Investor Relation team of First REIT to seek further clarifications on the assertions that were being made by the analyst. 

This morning, I received a return call from First REIT Investor Relation officer. I must say that they are very professional and prompt in their response. This actually speaks volume of the type of good management philosophy and values of the First REIT team lead by their CEO, Victor Tan.

The below are the key highlights of my discussion with the Investor Relation Officer of First REIT this morning:

·        Yes, it is true. There is an 80% rental income support by the sponsor Lippo Karawaci to Siloam. This is not a typo in Phillip Securities Research report. This issue was first raised up about a year ago by OCBC’s Research team.

·        Background was that Siloam used to be a business division under Lippo Karawaci. Hence master lease was signed between First REIT and Lippo Karawaci. After listing of Siloam Hospital Group in 2013 as a separate legal entity, new leases began to be negotiated directly between Lippo Karawaci and First REIT.

·        There are many investors who have been also asking this question at various investors road show.

·        There are a number of stakeholders involved in the negotiation, namely, Lippo OUE, Lippo Karawaci and Siloam Group. Many teams of lawyers representing the different stakeholders are trying to reach a draft agreement. The targeted date to present out a first cut for EGM to shareholders will be around December 2020 which is one year before the expiry of the master lease for the first batch of properties. However, First REIT is aware of the concern by many shareholders and is trying to present a proposal for shareholders’ approval way before the 1 year expiry target date. In the event that the proposed new lease agreement is rejected by shareholders (Lippo will abstain their votes for this EGM), they will go back to the drawing board. 

·         80% drop in rental in the worst case scenario is unlikely. According to the Investor Relation Officer, if the rental is so low, they might as well decide to let another healthcare group to come in to operate the hospital.

  

My Personal thoughts:

I can only conclude that there are various ticking time bombs inside First REIT that I was unaware of until the recent turn of events. The first one that is set to go off will be the first batch of expiring hospitals and hotel under Lippo Karawaci in December 2021.

I think that the probability the renewal will be done at a lower rate is almost 100% given that the financial statements of Siloam is clearly showing that its financial resources will not be able to cover the entire huge gap of 80% subsidy by Lippo Karawaci based on the detective work done by the analysts combing through the 2018 annual report of Siloam.

The only question is how much will be the drop in rental income? The first batch expiring is due only in December 2021 and make up only 22% revenue of total revenue. Hence assuming a 50% confirmed drop in rental income from Siloam during the lease renewal exercise, it will translate to only a 11% decline in overall property income of First REIT. Remaining lease only expire in year 2025 to 2032 which is still a long way to go.

Has this been priced into the current market price per unit of First REIT?

Before the issue of the credit crunch and lease renewal came up, First REIT units were trading at a range of of $1.30 to S$1.40 range in 2018. Its price dropped to almost S$0.90 during the credit default risk period but eventually recover to hold at around S$1.00 to S$1.10 after the rights issue by its sponsor, Lippo Karawaci. This is approximately a 25% to 30% correction in price by the market due to the uncertainty over the upcoming lease renewal exercise. It would appear that the market had already priced in most of the reduction from the original 6.5% yield as risk premiums. The yield has now shot up to 8.4% based on current market unit price of S$1.01 per unit.

The risk is price may drop by another 11% in line with the net decreased impact of the first batch of renewed properties by 50% or worse, investors may extrapolate and automatically price in expected future declines in all properties to derive a more sustainable property income and associated dividends. It will be hard to visualize the equilibrium point to be reached if investors views are so pessimistic.  

What if renewed lease is no longer in SGD but IDR denominated?

Also, on the issue of new lease contract being in IDR instead of SGD which gives rise to forex fluctuations, the CEO Victor Tan had mentioned previously that he can peg the rental adjustment to  higher inflation rates benchmark in Indonesia rather than Singapore in order to close up the exposure in forex risk.

Parting thoughts

First REIT remained a higher risk REIT relative to other REITS due to the many variables surrounding it. For me, I will gradually be doing a partial paring down of my stakes in First REIT over the next 1 year to reduce concentration risk in view of the latest information but I maintain an optimistic view that much of the negative information has already been priced into this REIT with a long WALE of 8 years in the medium term. Also, 8.4% yield up to Dec 2021 before the first batch of hospital properties reached expiry represented an almost 17% (2 years’ worth of dividends compensation) to cover any further downside. Part of my optimism comes in from the new CEO John Riady who confirmed that Healthcare will be one of Lippo’s key business unit (which is at lower risk of technological disruption). It also does not make sense for both Lippo Karawaci and Lippo OUE to dramatically destroy their own reputation by dropping the rental to the extreme scenario of 80% as they still need to tap capital from the market.

First REIT Review- Super High Yield of Over 8% And Possibility of 80% Drop in Rental Income For Upcoming Renewal Of Expiring Hospitals

I just saw something shocking from an analyst report by Phillip Securities Research on 7^th October 2019 with regard to First REIT. Basically, the uncertainties over the lease renewal of expiring hospitals and a hotel in 2021 seems to be the main cause of the low unit price despite the completion of the fund raising via rights issue exercise by Lippo Karawaci to resolve the previous rental default risk. Apparently, there is another significant risk of as much as 80% income support deficit should the sponsor decides to leave direct negotiation between Siloam and First REIT. This information is something very material because if it is true, it means that in the worst case scenario, First REIT maybe worth only 20 cents (by applying similar 80% discount to recent market price of S$1.01) per unit since such principle will apply to all hospitals tenancy agreements eventually.

The earliest lease expiry of 5 properties will start between August 2021 and December 2021. FIRST REIT will probably give some indication on negotiation status and key renewal contractual clauses 1 year before the expiry, that is at around August 2020 next year. Please see below screenshot.

Background giving rise to the shocking analysis by the Analyst

According to the Analyst, Siloam hospital operations are on stable footing and Lippo Karawaci could potentially step out of the lease renewal negotiation and let Siloam and First REIT deal directly with one another. Lippo Karawaci’s hospital operator division is known as PT Siloam International Hospitals (“Siloam”) and is listed in September 2013 on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Lippo Karawaci owns 51% of Siloam and provides income support by subsidizing 80% of the rental for the hospitals.

Siloam is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. In FY2018, rental paid to Lippo Karawaci was IDR125.5bn (S$12.2Mil), which only constitutes 20% of the rent paid to First REIT.

Now, not sure why is there such a thing as Lippo Karawaci subsidizing 80% rental indefinitely for its hospital business division as this does not make commercial sense. There must be a form of income recovery somewhere from Siloam. Else it means that Lippo Karawaci is running a substantial loss making business division perpetually. 80% free subsidy for another legal entity is incredulous even if it is a related party business. This also means that Lippo Karawaci had sponsored a healthcare REIT that has a ticking time bomb inbuilt during its IPO many years back.

I have written in to First REIT investor inquiry email for further clarifications to make light out of the whole enigmatic circumstances relating to the "income support" by sponsor.

Updates as at 18 Oct 2019- Reply from First REIT Investor Relation on the 80% sponsor income support.

The Never Ending Hyflux Saga- Utico Deal May End In Shambles

I was very disappointed last month when the Court again grant Hyflux another 2 months extension of the debt moratorium again. It was alleged that the predominately show stopper was the inability of the senior management of Hyflux to resolve the cap of S$25Mil imposed by Utico over professional and advisors’ fees in the restructuring agreement. Power struggle over board representation was also alleged to be the other issues holding back the signing of the restructuring and capital injection agreement by Utico.

The absolute lack of meaningful progress was even after Utico has managed to get creditors’ approval for the restructuring agreement and many perpetual retail investors got a very good deal relative to the first rescue package from Salim-Medco. Small retail investors could get as much 50% cash redemption. It was reported that Hyflux retail perpetual securities and preference (PNP) shareholders could get between "$50 million minimum to $150 million on the high side depending on the restructuring options which they choose". Of course, this is definitely so much better than the worst case scenario of forced liquidation where they are not going to get a single cent.

Unfortunately, the Utico deal may end in shambles and lead to the possible downfall of Hyflux due to the following reasons:

1.   Firstly, it is a fact that the management of Hyflux had make a fatal mistake from day one when they under-quoted the water desalination business of Tuaspring by the wrong assumption that the power generating business will be extremely profitable and hence able to subsidize the water treatment segment. This was the cause of the current predicament of Hyflux that has dragged on for many years. But right now, the management seems to be shopping around for the best deal on the block on offer by the numerous white knights that are perceived to be “dying to bail out” Hyflux. They sure have taken a long time to search for a white knight and are not afraid to delay signing any rescue package until all their wish list demands have been met by the White Knight.

I was very surprised that apparently, the bargaining power seems to have been residing more of in the hands of Hyflux which has defaulted on its obligations to numerous creditors (and surviving through the grace of the Singapore Court), rather than in the hands of the White Knight that has the capital. Despite this being closely aligned with my favorite motto of “Who dares wins”, this approach may just backfire anytime.

2.   Secondly, Hyflux had tried to forfeit the S$39Mil deposit placed by the Salim-Medco, the first White Knight to the rescue. With the PUB taking over the loss making water desalination segment of Tuaspring, the massive hemorrhaging in Hyflux business had stopped and things actually improved. Perhaps sensing an improvement in its business fundamentals and valuation from the taking away of the huge loss making business by PUB, Hyflux went on to assert that Salim-Medco had breached the agreement when they withdrew their initial offer and are willing to waste legal resources to play hardball with their first white knight in a bid to gobble up the S$39Mil placed in escrow. From a legal perspective, Hyflux did indeed have a case but personally and ethically, I thought that this was a bad move as it sullied Hyflux’s own reputation among other potential White Knights.

3.   Thirdly, for the case of Utico, the 2^nd rescuer, the lawyers representing Hyflux management team had cited that there are other “White Knights” waiting to rescue Hyflux even if the Utico deal does not go through as part of the argument for debt moratorium extension. I find such arguments offensive and personally, I think a bit conceited. They seems to have taken the white knights for granted.

Summarising, from the way the management are handling the cases of Salim-Medco and also Utico, other potential white knights who are waiting in line can see for themselves the behavior of the management of Hyflux in contract negotiation. Should the Utico deal fails, all other potential White Knights that are perceived to be waiting in the queue may also choose to simply walk away. This may just become a no rescue deal scenario with an eventual liquidation of Hyflux caused by none other than the Hyflux senior management themselves. I hope for the sake of the other stakeholders that this would be the last extension of the debt moratorium and the conclusion of the much anticipated signing off on the Utico rescue package.

The Tragic Fate of Singtel- Will Price Plummet Continue?

Since Singtel announced its Q1 FY19/20 results (ending 30 June 2019) on 8^th August 2019, it has dropped from its peak of S$3.56 per share on 5^th July 2019 to the current S$3.10 per share. That is a huge plunge of its share price by almost 13% within 2 months. But if one compares Q1 FY19/20 to the prior Q1 FY18/19 financial results of a whopping 35% drop in profits, then this is considered as just a small chink in the armour of Singtel.

Even if we just compare it to the previous quarter of Q4FY/18/19 of S$773Mil, this still represents a 30% decline in net profits from 2 consecutive quarters. Is this the start of an ominous downward trend?

To complicate matters, investing in Singtel shares also depends on widely fluctuating seasonality market sentiment. There are certain period during the year whereby the share price rally without any apparent reasons and at other times, it is in doldrums form regardless of financial performance. The strange pattern of huge plunge in share price typically happens after dividends declaration during the second half of the year and then all the major players started jumping right back in before the final dividends declaration the following year tends to repeat itself all over again and again.

A few key points to highlight with regard to the latest performance:

1. Disastrous results in overseas market for associate companies.

From the financial results (please refer to screenshot 1), the chief culprit for the weak numbers is once again the performance of Singtel’s associate results. A closer look will reveal that this is actually the result of Bharti Airtel fighting a brutal price war in India when Reliance Jio jumped into the fray in September 2016. Investors need to be skeptical of the honey coated words from analysts that the situation is expected to improve due to consolidation of players in the India telecom industry and “the sun will shine once again soon” talk.

So far, I have not seen any signs of major improvement in getting out of losses yet despite the crystal ball predictions by these analysts for the past 1 year. The rights issue for Bharti Airtel was the last straw for me to sell off all my stakes in Singtel. In March 2019, Singtel pumped in US$525Mil (around S$719Mil) for its 15% direct stake in this fund raising exercise to re-capitalize the balance sheet of Airtel. The funny thing is that after I sold off my shares, it went on to rally to a high of S$3.54 before taking a plunge back to S$3.10 recently.

The only good news is that excluding Airtel’s disastrous financial results, contributions from regional associates would actually have risen by 10% driven mainly by Indonesian Telkomsel. So not all is bad.

2. Cybersecurity and Group Digital Life businesses continue to make losses

Singtel’s cybersecurity business continue to chalk up losses of S$102Mil (before taxes) in last financial year and the bleeding continues in the latest first quarter results announcement. As usual, Group digital life is also still in the red.

The hope here is that Trustwave will start turning in profits and eventually, an IPO can make spin off these Trustwave along with digital life businesses by Singtel to reap a return on investments similar to what they did for Netlink Trust.

Singtel management kept emphaisisng a different set of KPI should be used to measure these businesses instead of just purely profit and losses. I am not sure whether I buy their logic. To me, a business must definitely be profit making else it will end up like WeWork IPO- a USD47 billion valued business is now possibly facing bankruptcy. The strange phenomenon of technological startup companies going for IPO with track record of huge losses is something which I cannot comprehend the sanity of it.

3. Bright spot- Rise of 5G Wireless Network for Australia, Singapore as well as for other Asia overseas markets. 

Singtel has already made major investments in network spectrum under Optus in Australia. In Singapore, it is expected to be pump in significant capital expenditure into the 5G network development. Given the high demand for high speed internet services and the conveniences offered via mobile network for this technological leap, Singtel would be able to attract lots of customers to drive its earnings forward.

4. Excellent corporate culture in using technology for innovation and cost control

Singtel’s management team is well known for using technology to drive productivity and cost control. For example, it had long began implementing Robotic Process Automation (“RPA”) into its various internal work processes. This has greatly enhanced productivity by removing routine work using manual labour. 

In addition, continuous developments in its digital services and products and bundling them with existing services as well as the synergy in implementing them across various overseas market offers great value in retaining existing clients and attracts new customers.

5. Valuation of Singtel share price

Now this is extremely challenging as it is a reflection of one’s outlook of the future variables that determines its pricing. For me, I will use what I can see with my own eyes that is, based on the latest published financial results. A quick and dirty way to do the valuation would be since Q1 FY19/20 profit dropped 30% from the Q4 FY18/19, we will apply the same discount to the price on 30 June 2019 of S$3.50 to derive a conservative floor target of S$2.45 per share. The assumption here is that given ceteris paribus and the only main driver is the worse than anticipated financial performance, then the share price should drop accordingly in percentage.

Given that Bharti Airtel is already reaching the bottom of the price war and also the potential growth of new 5G services subscription as well as growth in digital services, I will reduce the haircut by 15% to derive an estimated S$2.98 per share.    

Parting thoughts

At the current pricing of S$3.13 per share, I thought that Singtel is slightly overpriced but overall still decent given its businesses spread across various overseas markets and the impending rise of 5G technology adoption which offers attractive value proposition to consumers. The only question mark is whether Bharti Airtel in India can win the competition for subscribers to become profitable again after quarters and quarters of losses in the India market. The gain in India market share and revenue seems to be pointing to some obscure revival signs-albeit still not that clear at the current juncture- that things may improve next year.

Lendlease Commercial Global REIT Debut With One Possible Bad Debt From Tenant Forever 21

Not sure whether it is an inauspicious start for Lendlease REIT IPO but one of its top 10 tenants, Forever 21's US Headoffice just filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in US. Luckily it made up only 1.6% of gross rental income but nevertheless, this is still a possible doubtful debt case for 313@Somerset. Hopefully, the rental deposit will be enough to offset any potential default.

Top 10 Tenants For Lendlease Commercial Global REIT

IPO results are informally out although CDP account has not reflected it, one can check their bank account for the refund of application money to know whether they have been allotted any units. I applied for 5,000 units and only received 2,000 units. My other half applied for 25,000 units and got a weird 4,100 units allotment. Perhaps the issuance manager decided to allocate units to all retail subscribers but gave out a smaller slice to each individual. The formal publication of results later will shed some more light on their allocation method and the demand for Lendlease REIT.