Post Evaluation SREITs Mini-Rally- Are They Still Cheap?

 

SGX REIT Data- As at 23 October 2026 Closing.

 

Singapore REITs (S-REITs) - Valuation & Yield Table

All 39 SGX-listed REITs - Prices at close of Fri, 23 Oct 2026

No.	Name of REIT	SGX Code (Ccy)	Unit Price Close 23 Oct 2026	NAV / Unit (as at)	Premium / Discount	Payout Freq.	Last Routine Distribution	Annualised Distribution	Fwd Dist. Yield	Aggregate Leverage	Sector
1	CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust	C38U (SGD)	S$2.300	S$2.1530 Jun 26	+7.0%Premium	HY	S$0.06021H26	S$0.1204	5.23%	37.4%	Integrated REIT
2	CapitaLand Ascendas REIT	A17U (SGD)	S$2.230	S$2.2730 Jun 26	-1.8%Discount	HY	S$0.07481H26	S$0.1496	6.71%	39.7%	Industrial
3	CapitaLand Ascott Trust	HMN (SGD)	S$0.820	S$1.14530 Jun 26	-28.4%Discount	HY	S$0.02531H26	S$0.0506	6.17%	37.7%	Hospitality
4	CapitaLand China Trust	AU8U (SGD)	S$0.610	S$1.0430 Jun 26	-41.3%Discount	HY	S$0.02451H26	S$0.0490	8.03%	40.4%	Integrated REIT
5	CapitaLand India Trust	CY6U (SGD)	S$0.870	S$1.2330 Jun 26	-29.3%Discount	HY	S$0.04001H26	S$0.0800	9.20%	38.0%	Integrated REIT
6	Mapletree Industrial Trust	ME8U (SGD)	S$1.800	S$1.6330 Jun 26	+10.4%Premium	Qtr	S$0.03111Q FY26/27	S$0.1244	6.91%	37.5%	Industrial
7	Mapletree Logistics Trust	M44U (SGD)	S$1.090	S$1.2630 Jun 26	-13.5%Discount	Qtr	S$0.01821Q FY26/27	S$0.0726	6.66%	40.5%	Industrial
8	Mapletree Pan Asia Commercial Trust	N2IU (SGD)	S$1.170	S$1.7330 Jun 26	-32.4%Discount	Qtr	S$0.01961Q FY26/27	S$0.0784	6.70%	37.7%	Integrated REIT
9	Keppel DC REIT	AJBU (SGD)	S$2.130	S$1.7330 Jun 26	+23.1%Premium	HY	S$0.05711H26	S$0.1143	5.37%	34.0%	Data Centre
10	Keppel REIT	K71U (SGD)	S$0.815	S$1.2230 Jun 26	-33.2%Discount	HY	S$0.02611H26	S$0.0522	6.40%	40.0%	Commercial
11	Acrophyte Hospitality Trust	XZL (USD)	US$0.225	US$0.6830 Jun 26*	-66.9%Discount	HY	Suspended	–	0.00%	44.0%	Hospitality
12	AIMS APAC REIT	O5RU (SGD)	S$1.400	S$1.2730 Jun 26	+10.2%Premium	Qtr	S$0.02572Q FY27	S$0.1028	7.35%	24.9%	Industrial
13	Alpha Integrated REIT	M1GU (SGD)	S$0.475	S$0.5330 Jun 26	-10.4%Discount	HY	S$0.02031H26	S$0.0406	8.55%	34.9%	Industrial
14	BHG Retail REIT	BMGU (SGD)	S$0.460	S$0.7330 Jun 26*	-37.0%Discount	HY	S$0.00121H26	S$0.0024	0.52%	40.1%	Retail
15	CDL Hospitality Trusts	J85 (SGD)	S$0.705	S$1.3730 Jun 26	-48.5%Discount	HY	S$0.02151H26	S$0.0430	6.10%	35.3%	Hospitality
16	Centurion Accommodation REIT	8C8U (SGD)	S$1.040	S$0.8730 Jun 26	+19.5%Premium	HY	S$0.03501H26	S$0.0700	6.73%	29.9%	Hospitality
17	Daiwa House Logistics Trust	DHLU (SGD)	S$0.400	S$0.6330 Jun 26	-36.5%Discount	HY	S$0.01821H26	S$0.0364	9.10%	40.1%	Industrial
18	Digital Core REIT	DCRU (USD)	US$0.440	US$0.7930 Jun 26	-44.3%Discount	HY	US$0.01801H26	US$0.0360	8.18%	39.2%	Data Centre
19	Elite UK REIT	MXNU (GBP)	£0.305	£0.4430 Jun 26	-30.7%Discount	HY	£0.01551H26	£0.0310	10.16%	34.8%	Commercial
20	ESR REIT	9A4U (SGD)	S$1.990	S$2.5030 Jun 26	-20.4%Discount	HY	S$0.11251H26 core	S$0.2250	11.31%	41.4%	Industrial
21	Far East Hospitality Trust	Q5T (SGD)	S$0.510	S$0.87530 Jun 26	-41.7%Discount	HY	S$0.01631H26	S$0.0326	6.39%	32.8%	Hospitality
22	First REIT	AW9U (SGD)	S$0.176	S$0.2330 Jun 26	-23.5%Discount	HY	S$0.00981H26	S$0.0196	11.14%	45.7%	Medical
23	Frasers Centrepoint Trust	J69U (SGD)	S$2.180	S$2.3230 Sep 26	-6.0%Discount	HY	S$0.06212H FY26	S$0.1243	5.70%	38.7%	Retail
24	Frasers Logistics & Commercial Trust	BUOU (SGD)	S$0.905	S$1.1231 Mar 26	-19.2%Discount	HY	S$0.02951H FY26	S$0.0590	6.52%	33.7%	Integrated REIT
25	IREIT Global	UD1U (SGD)	S$0.166	S$0.4630 Jun 26	-63.9%Discount	HY	€0.0037 (≈S$0.0055)1H26	S$0.0110	6.61%	45.5%	Commercial
26	KORE US REIT	CMOU (USD)	US$0.148	US$0.7030 Jun 26	-78.9%Discount	HY	US$0.00401H26	US$0.0080	5.41%	43.3%	Commercial

Gas Cuts, Conspiracy Theories and Hot Air: Indonesia’s Dirty Playbook Against Singapore.

Hi Folks, welcome back to Investment Income for Life. Today’s post is a little different from my usual dividend and portfolio updates. Over the past two weeks, Singapore has found itself on the receiving end of some rather hostile words, and now actions, from across the Straits. As investors living in a small, resource-poor city-state of Singapore, I think it is worth stepping back and asking what this episode tells us about risk, resilience and where Singapore needs to go next.

1. What Happened This Week
This year’s haze has been the worst since 2015. The 24-hour PSI peaked at 230 on 18 October, and for a few days Singapore was ranked among the most polluted cities in the world. Our government decided enough was enough. NEA sent legal notices to 10 companies over fires believed to be on their land, SGX queried seven listed agricultural firms about their operations and possible links to the haze, and Senior Minister K Shanmugam made it clear that companies would not escape responsibility.

The response from Jakarta was not cooperation, but retaliation. On 22 October, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Downstreaming and Energy Transition, Bahlil Lahadalia, warned that he would evaluate energy export agreements and would not hesitate to consider stopping exports to countries that do not respect Indonesia. He did not name Singapore, but nobody needed a map to figure out who he meant. Two days later, on 24 October, Indonesia cut pipeline gas exports to Singapore by about 9%, officially to divert supply for domestic electricity needs in Batam, Bintan and Sumatra. Convenient timing, wouldn’t you say?

The good news is that EMA has said the reduction amounts to less than 2% of Singapore’s total daily gas demand of more than 1,000 BBTUD, and contingency plans are in place. The lights stay on. But the message behind the move is what matters.

2. The MSCI Conspiracy Theory
Around the same time, MSCI said it expects to remove Indonesia from its global indices unless the market makes major improvements in governance. Indonesian stocks tumbled by the most since the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. MSCI’s concerns are hardly a secret: shareholding opacity, insider trading and weak regulatory enforcement. A final decision is expected by 30 June 2027.

Instead of looking inward, former Indonesian trade minister Muhammad Lutfi took to Instagram and alleged that Temasek and GIC had pressured MSCI to threaten a downgrade, triggering mass panic so that Singapore could buy up Indonesia’s best assets on the cheap. Temasek called the allegations baseless and patently untrue, and GIC pointed out it has invested in Indonesia for more than 30 years.

Here is the part I find most telling. Even the president director of the Indonesia Stock Exchange, Jeffrey Hendrik, publicly defended MSCI’s independence. CNN Indonesia also noted there was nothing in MSCI’s announcement to support Lutfi’s claims. Folks, when your own stock exchange will not back your conspiracy theory, it is probably time to put the phone down. Index providers reclassify markets based on investability and governance, not on the wishes of a neighbouring sovereign fund. Blaming Singapore for MSCI’s verdict is a bit like blaming the thermometer for your fever.

3. Singapore, the Convenient Punching Bag
This is not new. Every few years, some Indonesian politicians reach for the Singapore card. During past haze crises, one minister complained it was “insulting” that Singapore offered only one aircraft to fight the fires, and another blamed the wind. This year, the head of Indonesia’s government communications agency told us that when there is no haze, Indonesia sends us oxygen. You really cannot make this up.

To be fair, SM Shanmugam was careful to say these views do not reflect the wider Indonesian government or public, and President Prabowo has been making efforts on the haze. Ordinary Indonesians suffer from the haze as much as we do, if not more. But in my view, a small but loud group of politicians finds it far easier to point at the little red dot than to explain to their own people why the economy is struggling, why governance problems are spooking global investors, and why the same plantation fires keep burning year after year. A foreign bogeyman is a cheap distraction from domestic hardship and poor governance.

4. History Rhymes: The Water Lesson
Older readers will remember that Singapore has been here before. For decades, we depended heavily on Malaysia for water, and whenever relations soured, certain Malaysian politicians, Dr Mahathir being the most famous, would raise the spectre of turning off the taps or renegotiating the price. It was leverage, plain and simple.

Singapore’s answer was not to shout back. It was to invest. NEWater and desalination turned water from a vulnerability into a national strength, and today the “Four National Taps” mean no single neighbour can hold us hostage. The threats did not stop because Singapore won the argument. They stopped working because Singapore removed the leverage.

5. Energy: Time for a Fifth Tap
Energy is our modern-day water problem. The vast majority of Singapore’s electricity is generated from natural gas, and a meaningful portion of that gas still arrives by pipeline from Indonesia. This week’s 9% cut is small in absolute terms, but it is a clear signal that gas supply can and will be used as a political weapon.

I see two things Singapore must do. First, diversify our LNG sources aggressively across more supplier countries, so that no single exporter can squeeze us. Second, and more importantly, Singapore should seriously embark on building small modular light-water nuclear reactors on home soil. Modern reactor designs are far smaller and safer than the plants of the past, they run around the clock regardless of weather, and they produce no carbon. Just as NEWater freed us from water threats, home-grown nuclear power could free us from energy threats. It will take years of planning, regulation and public engagement, which is exactly why we should start now, not during the next crisis.

6. What This Means for Investors
Let me put on my investor hat for a moment. First, governance risk in Indonesian equities is real and now has a deadline attached. If MSCI follows through in 2027, passive fund outflows could weigh on the market for some time. Investors with direct Indonesian exposure, or funds heavy in Indonesia, should know what they own and why.

Second, keep an eye on the SGX-listed plantation and agribusiness names that were questioned over the haze. Regulatory scrutiny and reputational risk can hit valuations, as we saw when several of these counters slipped after SM Shanmugam’s remarks.

Third, and on a more positive note, episodes like this tend to accelerate investment in Singapore’s energy security, from LNG infrastructure and regional power imports to longer-term clean energy. That is a theme worth following for long-term investors. As always, this is my personal view and not financial advice, so do your own homework.

7. Parting Thoughts
Singapore cannot choose its neighbours, and we should always aim for good relations with Indonesia, a country of great people and enormous potential. But hope is not a strategy. The lesson from water applies equally to energy: the best response to threats is to quietly build our way out of dependence. When our vital resources are secure, the bluster from across the Straits becomes just noise, and we can get back to what we do best, which is building wealth and income for life.

Ok folks, that's all from me today. Have a great week ahead!

The Battery King Stumbles-CATL (3750.HK) Down 57% From Its Peak: Bargain or Falling Knife?

Hi Folks, welcome back to Investment Income for Life! This week I want to talk about a stock that has given a lot of investors whiplash in 2026: Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd, better known as CATL (HKEX: 3750). Since its IPO on HKEX in May 2025, this stock has been on my watchlist but it just kept climbing higher and higher till almost HKD800 per share relative to its IPO price of HKD263 per share. It is the undisputed king of EV batteries, yet its Hong Kong shares have crashed from a record HK$794.50 in June to just HK$338.40 as of 22 October 2026. That is a 57% drop in about four months. So is this a bargain in the making, or a falling knife? Let's dig into the numbers together.

1. Meet CATL, the Battery Giant
CATL was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in Ningde, Fujian. It is the world's largest maker of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and also the No. 1 supplier of energy storage system (ESS) batteries. In 2025 it held 39.2% of the global EV battery market, its ninth straight year at the top, and 30.4% of global ESS shipments, its fifth straight year as leader.

Roughly 70% of revenue comes from EV batteries, about 15 to 20% from energy storage, and the balance from battery materials, recycling, lithium mining and other businesses. The A shares have traded in Shenzhen (300750) since 2018. The H shares listed in Hong Kong on 20 May 2025 at HK$263, the biggest IPO in the world that year, and joined the Hang Seng Index in February 2026.

One quirk worth knowing: the H-share float is tiny, only about 218 million out of 4.63 billion shares. That small float is why the H shares have traded at a large, and very jumpy, premium to the A shares.

2. The Share Price Rollercoaster

Here is the ride so far. From the IPO at HK$263, the stock more than doubled by October 2025, consolidated through the turn of the year, then rocketed after a blowout Q1 2026 to an all-time high of HK$794.50 in June. Since then it has been one-way traffic down. At HK$338.40, the shares are 33% below the 2025 year-end close of HK$505.50, though still about 29% above the IPO price.

3. Key Events You Should Know

•       20 May 2025: Hong Kong listing at HK$263, raising about US$4.6bn. Shares jumped 16% on debut.

•       9 Mar 2026: FY2025 results. Revenue up 17%, net profit up 42%, record gross margin of 26.3%, and a final dividend of RMB 6.957 per share.

•       1 Apr 2026: China cut the battery export VAT rebate from 9% to 6%.

•       Apr 2026: Q1 profit jumped 48.5%. The H/A premium hit a record 46 to 48%.

•       28 to 30 Apr 2026: CATL placed 62.4 million new H shares at HK$628.20, raising HK$39.2bn, the largest Hong Kong equity deal of 2026.

•       Jun 2026: Record high of HK$794.50. BNP Paribas downgraded the H shares as the premium to A shares reached 55%.

•       24 Jul 2026: 1H26 profit up 42%. Interim dividend RMB 1.411 per share, plus an A-share buyback of RMB 20 to 40bn (shares to be cancelled).

•       1 Sep 2026: A 2% consumption tax on lithium batteries kicked in, rising to 4% from September 2027.

•       Sep 2026: Xiaomi and Li Auto shifted some orders to in-house and tier-two battery suppliers.

•       20 to 22 Oct 2026: Q3 profit of RMB 21.25bn missed consensus, gross margin slid to 20.7%, and JPMorgan cut the H shares to Neutral. The stock fell to HK$338.40.

4. The Scorecard at a Glance
Here are the key numbers side by side. Note that FY2026 covers only nine months and is unaudited.

Metric	FY2025 (full year)	FY2026 (9M to 30 Sep)
Revenue	RMB 423.7bn (+17%)	RMB 442.1bn (+56%)
Net profit (attributable)	RMB 72.2bn (+42%)	RMB 64.5bn (+32%)
Earnings per share	RMB 16.14	RMB 14.13
Gross margin	26.3% (5-year high)	22.7% (Q3: 20.7%)
Free cash flow (est.)	~RMB 88bn	~RMB 17bn
Dividend per share	RMB 7.964 (~HK$8.84)	RMB 1.411 interim (HK$1.629)
Payout ratio	50%	~15% of 1H profit
Cash & bank balances	RMB 333.5bn	RMB 372.1bn (30 Jun)
NAV per share	~HK$82.0	~HK$96.2
Price / NAV	6.2x	3.5x

5. Growth Is Strong, but Quality Is Slipping
On the surface, growth looks fantastic. Revenue for just the first nine months of 2026 already exceeds the whole of FY2025, up 56% year-on-year, powered by energy storage which grew a whopping 88% in the first half. The problem is that profit is not keeping pace. Net profit grew 32%, and the gap is widening every quarter. In Q3, revenue rose 59% but profit rose only 15%.

The culprit is margins. Gross margin has slid from 26.3% in FY2025 to 20.7% in Q3, the third straight quarterly decline. A heavier mix of lower-value products, the smaller export rebate and the new 2% consumption tax are all eating into profitability. And remember, that tax applies for the whole of Q4, so the next quarter will not get a free pass.

6. Cash Flow Has Weakened Sharply
For income investors like us, cash flow is what really pays the dividends. FY2025 was a superb cash year, with roughly RMB 88bn of free cash flow, about 1.2 times reported profit. 2026 is a very different story. Operating cash flow fell 24% for the nine months and was a mere RMB 1.4bn in Q3, because receivables and inventories each ballooned by around 50%. Meanwhile capex is running at record levels. Nine-month free cash flow is only about RMB 17bn, roughly a quarter of reported profit. That is a yellow flag I would not ignore.

7. The Balance Sheet Is a Fortress
Now for the good news. CATL is sitting on RMB 372bn of cash, about four times its bank borrowings of RMB 95bn. Leverage is under 10% of total assets, the current ratio is a comfortable 1.6x, and the company actually earns more in interest income than it pays out. On top of that, the April placement topped up the war chest with HK$39bn raised at near-record prices. Liquidity is simply not a concern here.

8. What About the Dividends?
CATL has paid out 50% of profit for three years running, delivering a total dividend of RMB 7.964 per share for FY2025 (about HK$8.84). The 2026 interim payout, however, was trimmed to just 15% of first-half profit, although management paired it with a sizeable RMB 20 to 40bn A-share buyback with the shares to be cancelled.

Here is the catch for income seekers. Because the H shares have traded at a big premium, the yield is modest. On the FY2025 payout, the trailing yield was only about 1.75% at the 2025 year-end price. Even at today's much lower price, the yield based on last year's full dividend is around 2.6%, which is not exactly an income stock. Also note the buyback is executed in A shares, so H-share holders benefit only indirectly. The key question is whether the full 50% payout returns with the FY2026 final dividend.

9. Valuation Has Reset
After a 57% fall from the peak, valuation looks a lot more reasonable. Trailing P/E has dropped from about 28x at the end of 2025 to around 15x, and price-to-NAV has compressed from 6.2x to 3.5x. That is still a premium to book value, but I reckon justifiable for a business earning a return on equity above 20%.

For those investors who subscribed to the share placement exercise at HK$628.20 per share and whereby HK$ 39.2 billion (approximately SGD 6.5 billion) was raised, the current crash in valuation is devastating. It means that new entrant shareholders are buying CATL at an almost whopping 50% discount to takeover their shares.

10. What I Am Watching Next

•       Q4 2026 margins: management expects a recovery, but the consumption tax bites for the full quarter.

•       Price pass-through: whether carmakers agree to share the new tax costs.

•       Market share in China: install share has slipped from 47.7% in Q1 to 41.3% in Q3 as tier-two players gain ground.

•       Working capital: receivables and inventories need to turn back into cash.

•       FY2026 final dividend: will the 50% payout ratio make a comeback?

•       Overseas expansion: progress at the Hungary (Debrecen) plant and the Spain joint venture with Stellantis.

11. Parting Thoughts
CATL remains the dominant, highly profitable and cash-rich leader in EV and energy storage batteries, and storage has become a genuine second growth engine. But the 2026 story has shifted from growth with expanding margins to growth with shrinking margins and weaker cash conversion, made worse by tax changes and big customers diversifying their suppliers.

At around 15x trailing earnings, the H shares now price in a good chunk of that bad news. Still, the next two quarters of margins and cash flow will tell us whether this is just a healthy reset or the start of a longer de-rating. For dividend-focused investors, the yield is not compelling enough on its own, so this is more of a growth-at-a-reasonable-price watchlist candidate than a core income holding. Personally, I would wait for evidence of margin stabilisation and a return to the 50% payout before getting excited. 

Ok folks, that's all from me today. Have a great week ahead!

(Disclaimer: This post is for information and education only and is not financial advice. I am not a licensed financial adviser. Please do your own due diligence before making any investment decision.)

Great Deal for Keppel Ltd, Not So Much for Keppel REIT Unitholders S$611 Million for a 60%-Occupied Building? A Closer Look at Keppel REIT’s Latest Buy.

Hi Folks, welcome back to Investment Income for Life. This morning (20 October 2026), Keppel Ltd announced that it will sell a 51% stake in Keppel South Central to its own sponsored REIT, Keppel REIT, for about S$611 million. On the surface it looks like a routine sponsor-to-REIT asset injection. But when you dig into the fine print, I think this is a very good deal for Keppel Ltd and a much less convincing one for Keppel REIT unitholders. Let me walk you through why.

1. The Deal in a Nutshell

Keppel South Central is a 33-storey Grade A office tower at 10 Hoe Chiang Road in Tanjong Pagar, completed in January 2025, with a net lettable area of about 522,500 sq ft. It carries top-tier green and smart building certifications (Green Mark Platinum Super Low Energy, WiredScore Platinum, SmartScore Platinum).

Keppel REIT will pay a total of about S$611 million in cash, made up of roughly S$149 million for the shares and roughly S$462 million to repay shareholder loans owed to Keppel. The agreed property value is S$1,228 million for 100% of the building, or about S$626 million for the 51% stake, which works out to around S$2,350 per sq ft of NLA. Completion is expected in 2Q2027, subject to Keppel REIT unitholders approving it at an EGM.

2. Why This Is a Sweet Deal for Keppel Ltd

First, Keppel gets cash. Around S$611 million flows back to Keppel, pushing its announced asset monetisation to S$3.7 billion year to date. Management has been clear that this capital will be recycled into higher-return opportunities, used to reduce debt and to reward shareholders. For Keppel shareholders who like special dividends and buybacks, that is music to the ears.

Second, Keppel has already done very well from this building. By its own account, Keppel South Central has generated more than S$380 million in total profits (including fair value gains) since its redevelopment in 2020. Selling now crystallises part of that gain.

Third, and this is the part I find most interesting, Keppel gives up control of 51% of the ownership but keeps almost all of the fee income. Keppel Real Estate Services will sign a new property management agreement and keep providing property management and leasing services. On top of that, Keppel's own REIT manager runs Keppel REIT, so a bigger REIT means higher asset-based management fees. Keppel calls this bringing the building into its "asset management ecosystem". In plain English: Keppel sells the bricks, keeps the fee stream.

Fourth, Keppel keeps 49% and an option to take back the rest. Although the building is freehold, the deal is priced as if Keppel REIT only holds a 70-year leasehold interest. After 70 years (or earlier upon certain specified events), Keppel can buy back the REIT's 51% for a grand total of S$1. Keppel effectively gets the freehold "tail" back for free.

3. Why I Am Less Excited as a Keppel REIT Unitholder

The biggest issue is that the building has not stabilised. As at 15 October 2026, committed occupancy was only about 60%, and that figure includes leases still being documented. Another 20% is "under negotiation", which is not the same as signed. Keppel REIT is paying a full Grade A valuation for an asset that is still in lease-up mode, so most of the leasing risk is being handed to the REIT.

Next, unitholders are paying freehold-style prices for what is economically a 70-year lease. A leasehold interest is a depreciating asset. Every year that passes, the remaining lease shortens, and at the end of 70 years the REIT's stake goes back to Keppel for S$1. REIT investors should mentally price in that decay rather than treating this like a perpetual freehold holding.

Then there is the governance angle. After completion, the company is expected to be converted into a limited liability partnership where decisions require unanimous resolution, with deadlock provisions. Keppel REIT may own the majority, but practically it cannot act without the sponsor's agreement. Majority ownership, shared control.

Finally, this is a related-party deal, with Keppel sitting on both sides as vendor, sponsor, REIT manager and property manager. It is allowed under the SGX rules (the announcement cites the Rule 915(3) exception), but it is precisely the type of transaction where minority unitholders need to scrutinise the price very carefully at the EGM.

4. The Income Support: Comfort or a Crutch?

To make the numbers work despite 60% occupancy, Keppel will provide income support. The REIT is guaranteed S$2,230,170 a month for its 51% share, which is about S$26.8 million a year. Keppel tops up any shortfall and also pays for tenancy works, tenancy incentives and capex during this period.

Based on my own quick sums, S$26.8 million on the S$626 million agreed value is an implied yield of only about 4.3%, and that is the guaranteed, best-case figure during the support period. For a Singapore office REIT, that is hardly a bargain. Note also that the guaranteed amount is set based on the building reaching 95% stabilised occupancy, so it is essentially a promise of what the building is supposed to earn, not what it earns today.

The support ends at the earliest of the building reaching 95% occupancy with the actual income meeting the guaranteed amount, or five years, or the REIT no longer being a shareholder. My concern is the five-year cliff. If leasing is slower than hoped, distributions are propped up for five years and then the REIT is left holding the real, unsupported number. Income support makes the DPU look good in the short run, but it does not change the underlying quality of the income.

5. What I Will Be Watching

Before the EGM, I will be looking out for how Keppel REIT funds the S$611 million (debt, new units, or both) and whether the deal is actually DPU-accretive on an ex-income-support basis. I will also be tracking whether the 20% of space under negotiation converts into signed leases, and what the independent financial adviser says about fairness. Interest rates matter too: if the REIT borrows at close to 4%, the spread over a 4.3% supported yield is wafer-thin.

To be fair to Keppel REIT, there are positives. It gets a brand new, highly certified Grade A tower in a growing precinct at the gateway to the Greater Southern Waterfront, plus tenants such as Manulife Financial Advisers, Industrious and the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore. If leasing goes well, the support may never be needed and the REIT may own a gem. But that "if" is carrying a lot of weight.

6. Parting Thoughts: My  Personal Take

I hold shares in both Keppel Ltd and also units in Keppel REIT. Actually, this is a classic sponsor win. Keppel Ltd unlocks cash, books another step in its asset-light transformation, keeps 49% plus the management and leasing fees, and holds an option to reclaim the full freehold for S$1 in 70 years. Keppel REIT, on the other hand, takes on lease-up risk at a full valuation, with a modest supported yield and a five-year income support cliff.

If I were a Keppel Ltd shareholder, I would be reasonably pleased. If I were a Keppel REIT unitholder, I would want to read the circular very carefully before voting yes.

As always, this post is my personal view for educational purposes and is not financial advice. Please do your own due diligence before making any investment decisions.

Ok folks, that's all from me today. Have a great week ahead!

This US Based SREIT Declined 23% Since July 2026 and Now Giving Out 10.2% Dividend Yield.

 

Today's deep dive into United Hampshire US REIT and its 42% discount to NAV and also the key risks to watch out for holding SREIT with US assets.

SGX REIT Data- As at 16 October 2026 Closing- Quick Reflection.

Hi Folks, welcome back to Investment Income for Life. This week I did something a little different. I got AI to help me compute a forward distribution yield for every SGX-listed REIT and stapled trust, all 39 of them, using closing prices as at Friday, 16 October 2026. The method is simple: take the latest routine distribution, annualise it (x2 for half-yearly payers, x4 for quarterly payers), and divide by the unit price. The key tweak: I told it to ignore any advanced distributions paid out before a rights issue or preferential offering for an acquisition, as well as one-off gains. Those payouts tend to distort the numbers, so stripping them out normalises the yield for sanity. Let's dive in.

Part 1-Click Picture to Enlarge for Viewing

Part 2-Click Picture to Enlarge for Viewing

1. The Big Picture
Across the 39 counters (excluding those not paying distributions), the average forward yield works out to 7.37% and the median to 6.92%. That is a very decent income stream for a basket of hard assets.

But the average hides a very wide spread. At one end, leaving aside BHG Retail REIT's token 0.52%, Parkway Life REIT yields just 4.37%. At the other, Sasseur REIT and ESR REIT are both above 11%. As always, the yield tells you as much about the market's fears as it does about the income.

2. The "Quality Premium" Club
Only six REITs are trading above their NAV and the notable ones as follow:

- Parkway Life REIT: +56.0% premium, 4.37% yield

- Keppel DC REIT: +19.7% premium, 5.52% yield

- Mapletree Industrial Trust: +9.8% premium, 6.95% yield (Note: MIT is in trouble over its North America data centres that are old school kind and unable to support the current in demand hyperscaler type)

- CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust: +3.7% premium, 5.40% yield

These are the names the market trusts: strong sponsors, resilient sectors (healthcare, data centres, Singapore industrial and retail) and a track record of steady DPU. You pay up for that peace of mind, and the yield is lower as a result. The other 32 counters with a stated NAV are all trading at a discount.

3. The Double-Digit Yielders
Five REITs are offering 10% or more on a forward basis:

- Sasseur REIT: 11.22% (Retail, China outlet malls)

- ESR REIT: 11.14% (Industrial, based on core DPU)

- First REIT: 10.65% (Healthcare, Indonesia hospitals)

- United Hampshire US REIT: 10.16% (Retail, US grocery-anchored)

- Elite UK REIT: 10.00% (Commercial, UK government-leased offices)

Hot on their heels are Daiwa House Logistics Trust (9.33%), CapitaLand India Trust (9.09%) and NTT DC REIT (9.04%). Most of these carry some form of currency, geographic or tenant concentration risk, which is why the market demands a higher yield to hold them.

4. The 70%+ Discount Graveyard: KORE, MUST and Prime
Now for the most interesting part of the table. The three US office REITs are trading at eye-watering discounts to book value:

- Manulife US REIT (MUST): -83.2% discount, distributions still suspended

- KORE US REIT: -79.1% discount, 5.48% yield

- Prime US REIT: -78.5% discount, 8.77% yield

These REITs imploded post COVID as work from home hollowed out demand for US offices. Occupancy fell, valuations got slashed, gearing went up and distributions were cut or suspended to preserve cash. I lost 1 arm and 2 legs holding all 3 of them previously as they held up well during COVID period...but thereafter, everyone knows what happened. When the market prices a REIT at 20 cents on the dollar of NAV, it is basically saying it does not believe the NAV.

I am not sure whether there are still many "value hunters" investing and holding them. Their unit prices have been in the doldrums for many years already, and every "this is the bottom" call so far has been premature. A deep discount on its own is not a margin of safety if the NAV keeps getting written down. For me, these remain a watch-from-the-sidelines group until there is clear evidence that office leasing in the US markets has turned.

5. United Hampshire US REIT: The One That Caught My Eye
United Hampshire US REIT ("UHREIT") looks very interesting. At US$0.425, it trades at a 41.8% discount to its NAV of US$0.73, and its 1H26 DPU of 2.16 US cents annualises to 4.32 US cents, a forward yield of 10.16% per annum.

Unlike the US office trio, UHREIT's grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail centres have held up far better. But as usual, the high yield reflects real uncertainty over the distributions, including:

- US interest rates staying higher for longer, which pushes up borrowing costs and weighs on valuations

- A depreciating USD against the SGD, which erodes returns for Singapore-based investors

- Potential changes to US withholding tax rules in an unpredictable policy environment under the current US administration

- Sponsors being unable to come to the rescue during REIT financial crisis, as the Trust Deed places constraints on how much they can increase their unitholdings before the REIT-Taxation vehicle breakdowns.

Maybe I will do a deeper review of UHREIT in another post when I have the time.

6. Parting Thoughts
- Yield is the price of uncertainty. The higher it goes, the harder you need to look at gearing, interest cover, currency and refinancing risk.

- A big discount to NAV is only cheap if the NAV is real. The US office REITs are the clearest reminder of that.

- The blue-chip S-REITs (CICT, CLAR, MIT, MLT, FCT) are yielding roughly 5.4% to 7.0%. Not spectacular, but steady, and they form the core of an income portfolio for many of us.

Anyway, personally for me, I am not in a hurry to go down big on SREITs, as I think more rate hikes are coming which should keep SREITs price depressed for a long time. 

Ok folks, that's all from me today. Have a great weekend ahead!

Disclaimer:
The forward yields above are my own simple computations based on the latest routine distribution and the closing price on 16 October 2026. Actual future distributions may be higher or lower. This post is for information and sharing only and is not investment advice. Please do your own due diligence before investing.