Tuesday, 28 December 2021
Tuesday, 14 December 2021
Dasin Retail Trust On The Verge Of Bankruptcy Declaration? Will It Be Suspended From Trading on SGX?
Sunday, 5 December 2021
Investment Portfolios Updates- S$619k (3 Dec'21)- Equity Portfolios Facing Challenge of Omicron COVID Variant
Tuesday, 30 November 2021
Digital Core REIT IPO- Exercise Some Caution If One is Venturing into This New Data Centre REIT Crusade.
Wednesday, 24 November 2021
(i) Mr Gerald's letter to Keppel Corp questioned why Keppel is making it so urgent for SPH shareholders to cast their votes. Keppel had mentioned that the sooner the scheme is approved, the better it is for SPH so as to reduce any further uncertainty and instability for its various stakeholders and preserve value.
Tuesday, 23 November 2021
For now, I think I will be staying away from DHLT as alluded to my discomfort over the 3 points listed above. Note that DHLT public tranche subscription will end by 24 November 2021 (Wed) 12pm. The REIT will commence trading on 26 November 2021 (Friday) 2am. Will this IPO flopped upon 1st day of trading or will it rise sharply?
Monday, 15 November 2021
Cuscaden Peak's Superior Counter Offer For Singapore Press Holdings at S$2.40 Per Share- Goodbye Keppel Corp!
|Cuscaden's offer of 2 options to SPH Shareholders are vastly superior to Keppel Scheme.|
First and foremost, I think that Keppel Corp management should not have made it clear upfront that their offer of S$2.351 per share is the last and final offer. Keppel Corp may have underestimated Cuscaden Peak's deep pockets. By making a statement that they have already made a final offer, it motivated Cuscaden to just tip the bar over a little to easily trump their bid. Anyway, this is water under the bridge.
|Vote down Keppel Scheme first and vote for Cuscaden Scheme later|
|SPH's investment property-Seletar Mall at Sengkang Fernvale|
Wednesday, 10 November 2021
Keppel Raises Counter-Offer Bid of SPH to S$2.351- Three Things Shareholders Need To Watch Out For And Not Drawn By Clever Marketing
The counter offer does seems great at first. However, I still can't help but feel disappointed that the deal still involves the distribution of units in Keppel REIT and SPH REIT. When the initial offer was announced, SPH REIT and Keppel REIT dropped in price but Keppel Corp did not make any comments about the decline.
P.S: Fellow SPH shareholders, please share your views and thoughts on the new counter-offer. Will you sell off immediately after trading halt is lifted to reduce further market risk? Or will you wait for another potential counter-offer from Cuscaden on 16th November 2021?
Monday, 8 November 2021
Strange Chain Offer for SPH REIT By Cuscaden For S$0.964 Per Unit And Possible Leakage of Keppel Corp Counter Offer?
Friday, 29 October 2021
Another Competing Offer for Singapore Press Holdings- S$2.10 PAID FULLY In CASH And Points To Note By Shareholders
|Extract of proposed offer S$2.10 all in hard cash|
|Extract of previous posting on 8th August 2021|
2.Safer deal for SPH shareholders- superiority to Keppel Corp's offer
Wednesday, 27 October 2021
Mapletree Industrial Trust Distribution Yield Hits 5%- Excellent Q2 FY21/22 Results With Completion of US Data Centres Acquisition
|Summary of Q2 and 1st Half FY2021/2022 results|
|Zoom in on Q2 Quarterly YoY results|
|MIT hits 5.05% distribution yield|
Tuesday, 19 October 2021
It was reported that Mr Oei and Mr Chew used to be good friends for about a decade, and went on holiday together with their wives on more than one occasion. However, their relationship soon soured and they became eternal rivals instead.
The discord had already started in 2017 when Mr Oei claimed that Mr Chew had agreed to find a buyer to buy-out his stakes in REC. This led to a lawsuit by Mr Oei against Mr Chew. Mr Oei eventually lost the suit in Feb 2020. Subsequently, there were various attempts by Mr Oei to oust Mr Chew out of REC.
In a bid to raise funds, REC has announced on 16th August 2021 that it intends to sell its current campus for S$200Mil and if possible arrange for a sales and leaseback. All potential buyers will be aware of the tight deadline that REC requires to raise cash to pay off short term debts which are due within a year. Not sure on whether it can get a good price considering the weak bargaining power REC has at this particular point in time. Well, I am not very optimistic on REC getting a good deal.
Wednesday, 13 October 2021
Dasin Retail Trust Bounced Back To Life with 22% Valuation Improvement- Will It Survive the Debt Crisis With Sino-Ocean Capital Taking Over As New Trust Manager?
Sunday, 10 October 2021
Monday, 4 October 2021
Will SPH Release A Special Dividend To Reward Shareholders Before Voting On Keppel Corp's Acquisition Offer?
Sunday, 3 October 2021
Friday, 1 October 2021
Saturday, 18 September 2021
Will Dasin Retail Trust Go Bankrupt And Be Put On Fire Sales? Annualised Distribution Yield at 12.9%.
1.Quick financial recap for Dasin
As at 30 June 2021, Dasin’s net asset value is S$1.46 per unit. DPU for the 1st half of 2021 is 2.98 cents which gives an astounding annualized yield of +14.36% at the latest closing price of S$0.415 per unit as at 17 September 2021. Take note that there is also income support for Dasin which will no longer be available from FY2022. The normalized 1st half DPU (if we were to add back the distribution waiver to some units due to this) will be 2.67 cents which still gives a dazzling annualized yield of +12.9%. The higher distribution relative to FY2020 is mainly due to recovery from covid-19 impact as well as contribution from Shunde Metro Mall and Tanbei Metro mall which were acquired in July 2020.
Before one rejoice, we need to delve into deeper discussion on the key going concern risk from the impact of Dasin’s maturing huge debt of S$500Mil that may result in a forced liquidation.
Dasin has S$422.7Mil of offshore debts and S$79.2Mil of onshore local debt that matured in July 2021-approximately S$500Mil.The bankers have extended these to 19th December 2021. Classification of these are thus “short term” which resulted in a current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) of less than 1. Since Dasin clearly does not have enough funds to repay all the loans, this will mean a default of loans and an immediate lawsuits from the lawyers representing the bankers which can lead to a forced liquidation and an unfavorable fire-sales of all shopping malls at a very low price. Unit-holders will also face suspension of trading of their units and get their liquidity stuck for 1-3 years (at least 1 year) under such adverse turn of event.
2. Bankers spooked by Dasin. A repeat of the Eagle Hospitality Trust Saga?
Most of the investors of Dasin are extremely worried about the reason why the consortium of banks renewed the term loans for Dasin until only 19 December 2021 and did not extend them for 3 to 5 years as per the normal practices with other REITs. There were also market talks that a local China bank pull out of the syndicated loan earlier this year which spooked the hell out of the remaining bankers.
It was also reported that the bankers were so filled with anxiety that they resorted to sending out personnel and officials to visit Dasin’s malls. Good news here is that the shopping malls under its portfolio seems to be packed and doing extremely well.
Hence it does not seemed to be another case of Eagle Hospitality Trust saga where the sponsor did a lot of magic tricks to move the money around out of cleverly engineered financial valuation of assets which resulted in many current lawsuits being filed. Dasin has also been paying out distributions for the past few years unlike Eagle Hospitality Trust which failed to even deliver its first distribution.
3. Other points to note- Sponsor Mr Zhang Zhencheng seems to have financial difficulties.
One interesting point to note is that Mr Zhang Zhencheng and his investment vehicle Aqua Wealth have pledged 38 Mil Dasin’s units as collateral for margin facilities with CGS-CIMB for purpose of securities trading. He has been forced by the broker to liquidate some of his Dasin’s holdings due to margin call. The fact that Mr Zhang Zhencheng did not top up additional cash to his margin account suggests that he has encountered some financial distress personally.
While it is true that Dasin and Mr Zhang’s Aqua Wealth are different legal entities, the implication here, in terms of corporate control environment, is that it leads to higher risk or pressure of possible financial misstatement in order to ensure the financials of Dasin looks well. Investors have this lingering doubt that things are not as rosy as reported for the 1st half results and there are cans of worms that may surface soon. Many failed business such as Eagle Hospitality Trust reported unrecorded liabilities only when special accountants were appointed to scrub through their books.
In addition, once we add in exorbitant default interest rates on bank loans as well as professional service firms such as liquidator and lawyers, a huge chunk of the net assets will be burnt up quickly to feed these hungry sharks which may result in little or none being left for the unit-holders.
4. Light at the end of the tunnel?
The good news here is that Mr Zhang Zhencheng is a smart man. He has pulled in a HKE listed investment holding company Sino-Ocean Capital (specializes in property investment and development activities in China) to take up a 70% stake in Dasin’s Manager. It has also granted an option to Sino-Ocean Capital to buy up to 26% of the units owned by Aqua Wealth. Sino-Ocean already held on to 6.36% of Dasin which will make it one of the biggest holder of up to 32.36% if the option is exercised.
Sino-Ocean is a state owned enterprise in China which thus placed it in an entirely different league with other S-chips listed on SGX (which were beset by corporate governance and accounting problems).
It was reported that the entry of Sino-Ocean was instrumental in the bankers agreeing to extend the original loan facilities maturing 18 July 2021 to 19 December 2021. The new Trust Manager is working with the bankers to secure a longer term syndicated loan. Anyway, 3 months left for negotiation with bankers and we will know the fate of Dasin soon.
So the key question at the end of the day is whether Dasin will survive this loan crisis. Phillip Securities, in July 2021, has issued a price target of S$0.780 per unit for Dasin which is an 88% potential upside. Personally, I think that this is a very risky time to enter into Dasin unless there are more information being released. Sino-Ocean Capital also has not exercised their option to acquire more units in Dasin hence they may still be doing their own due diligence and are uncertain. Henceforth, there may still be bigger surprises that are unrevealed yet.